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A RAY OF LIGHT FOR JUDGES BLINDED BY
SCIENCE: TRIERS OF SCIENCE AND
INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS
Erica Beecher-Monas*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judges, traditionally triers of law, occasionally pressed into
service as triers of fact, now must also be triers of science in cases
where experts proffer scientific evidence.' Years after Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 made judges responsible for
assessing scientific validity, judges are still grappling with the fact
that they can no longer merely count scientific noses3 but must
instead decide whether expert testimony meets the criteria of good
science.4 Predictably, not everyone is pleased with this new state of
affairs, and many question judicial competence in this area.5 But
* Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. LL.M.
Columbia University School of Law, M.S. (Anatomy) University of Miami. This article is
written in partial fulfillment of the J.S.D. requirements of the Columbia University School
of Law. The author is deeply grateful to the late Curtis J. Berger for his encouragement.
Many thanks also go to Frank P. Grad, Martha A. Fineman and to Theresa Beiner for their
helpful comments and criticism. For her unflagging enthusiasm, insight, and very able
research assistance, the author thanks Julie Peters Zamacona.
' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 Id.
' Before Daubert, the federal courts overwhelmingly applied a consensus standard for
admissibility. This was the standard of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923), which explained that scientific testimony must "be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
8 Skeptical about the feasibility of the Supreme Courts mandate, scholars, practitioners,
and journalists have all expressed reservations about the abilities of judges to assess
questions of scientific validity. See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699,
703 (1998) (arguing that scientists can assess reliability better than judges); Adina Schwartz,
A "Dogma of Empiricism"Revisited Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the
Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
149, 153 (1997) (castigating Daubert's "intellectual bankruptcy"); Jennifer Laser, Note,
Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1379, 1379
(1997) (arguing that increasing reliance on expert testimony has resulted in inconsistent
judicial decisionmaking); Developments in the Law--Confronting the New Challenges of
Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1493-1509 (1995) (arguing that the Daubert
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judges are not unarmed for these decisions.
The Supreme Court gave judges some rudimentary guidelines in
Daubert, outlining the notions of scientific validity and fit.6 The
Supreme Court reiterated and amplified these concepts in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner.7 In addition, the Federal Judicial Center has
published a reference manual for evaluating scientific evidence
which explains key aspects of scientific disciplines likely to be the
subject of expert testimony.' Courses have sprung up to help
familiarize judges with scientific issues.9 And, if all else fails, the
trial court may appoint its own experts for advice."l One analytic
framework that is generally overlooked, however, is the guidance of
federal regulatory agencies, which have been making sound
scientific validity determinations for generations.
analysis is essentially indeterminate and cannot account for results in particular cases); see
also Arthur Kantrowitz, ProposalforanlnstitutionforScientificJudgment, 156 SCIENCE 763,
764 (1967) (proposing science court to solve problem of judicial inability to handle expert
testimony); John L. Thornton, Courts of Law v. Courts of Science: A Forensic Scientist's
Reaction toDaubert, 1 SHEPHARD'SEXPERTANDSCI.EVIDENCEQ. 475, 482 (1994) (noting that
although much of forensic science has "precious little scientific foundation" judges continue
to find it admissible post-Daubert); cf. McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36F.3d 1396,1406
(8th Cir. 1994) (describing plaintiffs argument that Daubert makes expert testimony more
readily admissible, while defendant argued that Daubert makes expert testimony less readily
admissible). See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEo's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991). Judges themselves have expressed doubts about their capabilities.
Marcia Coyle, Cert. Granted For Expert Witness Case, NAT'LL.J., Mar. 31, 1997, atBi. Chief
Justice Rehnquist was prominent among the judges complaining about the gatekeeping role
assigned to judges by the Daubert majority. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 599-600 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Kozinski, on remand, was more
vociferous, calling the task of evaluating expert testimony "a far more complex and daunting
task in a post-Daubert world than before." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995).
G Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
7 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Joiner appears to be far from the last word. The Supreme Court
recently considered Daubert issues in the context of non-scientific expert testimony in Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 67 U.S.L.W. 4179 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1999).
s FEDERAL JUDICIAL OTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994).
9 See John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of Gatekeeping: The Federal
Judicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1183, 1204
(1996) (referring to the authors' courses for judges.)
'0 See FED. R. EVID. 706. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 provides for court-appointed
experts, and Daubert suggested that judges should take advantage of this rule. Some judges
do appoint their own experts. See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387,
1392 (D. Or. 1996) (describing basis for appointing independent advisors to court). This
option is not without its drawbacks, however. The court in Hall misunderstood and
mischaracterized its own experts, choosing some of their conclusions over others without
explanation. See id.
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Lessons from the federal regulatory agencies are particularly
salient because like judges, most agency decisionmakers are not
trained scientists, yet they must make creditable scientific validity
assessments. Through a process of articulating assessment
guidelines, soliciting comment from scientists and other interested
parties on the assessment guidelines, and requiring agency
decisionmakers to explain fully their determinations on the basis of
an adequate record subject to judicial review," the agencies have
developed a standard of intellectual due process which has much to
offer federal judges.
In particular, the Environmental Protection Agency has
developed a sensible set of Proposed Guidelines reflecting not only
the current scientific understanding of how such evidence about
toxic substances should be assessed but also incorporating explicit
policy considerations and explaining the basis and rationale for
each. While there are important limitations to a wholesale adoption
of agency decisionmaking criteria, the approach is well-grounded in
science. A similar-though not identical-approach, in conjunction
with the guidance of the Supreme Court guidelines and the Federal
Judicial Center's Manual, would enable federal trial judges to make
more intellectually defensible admissibility determinations based
on science, logic, and law.
This Article discusses and critiques the analytic frameworks
available to judges for their admissibility determinations. Focusing
on the troubling scientific admissibility issues presented in toxic tort
litigation, Part H of this Article discusses the failures of the
Supreme Court's Daubert and Joiner cases to provide the guidance
judges need to make scientifically adequate admissibility determina-
tions and illustrates these failings through a critique of their toxic
tort progeny. Part III appraises the guidance given in the Federal
Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. That
Part explains why, though the Reference Manual is helpful in
understanding the principles and methodology underlying several
" See Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960,17,960
(1996) [hereinafter Proposed Guidelines] (providing an example of administrative regulation
process). Notice and comment rulemaking procedures are mandated by the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553 (1994).
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scientific disciplines, it is not enough. Judges-and the lawyers
responsible for educating them about their cases-need to know
more than what goes into optimal experimental design. What
judges and lawyers need to know is not how to design the best
scientific study, but how to assess imperfect ones.'2
Assessing imperfect studies-that is, the scientific validity of
conclusions drawn from imperfect knowledge-is the explicit
mandate of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Proposed
Guidelines."3 Part IV summarizes the guidelines proposed by the
EPA to assess scientific validity and compares the composite
requirements of Daubert and Joiner with the requirements of
administrative agencies such as the EPA. This Part analyzes the
applicability to judicial determinations of agency guidelines aimed
at protecting the public health, the object of which is to assess
liability. Part IV argues that while the EPA guidelines cannot be
adopted in whole cloth, they offer valuable insights that may make
judicial decisionmaking more intellectually defensible and fair to the
litigants.
This Article concludes that although separately each set of
guidelines available to federal judges is insufficient to make sound
scientific validity determinations, together they illuminate impor-
tant facets of the determination. These guidelines can be combined
with an understanding of the process of science and the nature of
probabilistic reasoning to form a sound framework for analysis. The
purpose of this Article is to offer some suggestions for that process.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S CRITERIA
The federal trial judge faced with a proffer of scientific testimony
must first determine whether the expert's testimony is "scientific
knowledge" that will assist the factfinder to determine a fact in
2 No study is ever perfect, and those relied on by litigants are often less perfect than
most. See Jack L. Landau & W. Hugh O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissibility of
Animal Studies to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 521, 550 (1989).
One of the key problems is that animal toxicity studies are not designed to demonstrate
causation but to identify biological mechanisms of toxicity. See id.
13 See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11 (detailing carcinogen assessment and
reassessment procedures).
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issue. 4 To qualify as scientific knowledge, the Supreme Court held,
"an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific
method." 5 Assisting the factfinder, the Court explained, is the issue
of relevance, or "fit."'6 In Daubert, the Supreme Court's explanation
of both these precepts-scientific method and "fit"-was cursory at
best. Joiner" expanded the discussion of "fit" somewhat, but still
left many questions unanswered.
A. DAUBERVS EXPLANATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
Scientific validity and "good grounds" are synonymous, according
to the Court, and for scientific evidence good grounds implicates the
scientific method."8 In order to decide whether an inference or
assertion was derived by the scientific method and thus constitutes
scientific knowledge, Daubert instructs the trial judge to assess the
scientific validity of the reasoning underlying the testimony. 9 This
assessment must be performed whenever scientific evidence is
contested.20 Anything purporting to be scientific knowledge, short
1 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (stating "ft]he
subject of an experts' testimony must be 'scientific... knowledge' ").
15 Id. at 589.
18 Id. at 591.
1 Joiner involved claims that the plaintiffs lung cancer had been promoted by his
exposure to the defendants' PCBs, which the plaintiff sought to support by expert testimony
founded on two animal studies and four epidemiology studies. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997). The federal trial judge's admissibility determination starts with a
two-pronged inquiry into "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying testimony is
scientifically valid and... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied
to the facts in issue." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
" 509 U.S. at 590-91.
19 Id. at 593.
'o Unlike Frye, the Court did not limit its requirements to novel scientific evidence. The
decision in Frye, in distinction, was expressly limited to novel scientific evidence. See Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (explaining exclusion ofexpert testimony
which is not"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance"). Courts frequently
get this distinction confused and misreadDaubert as also limited to novel scientific evidence.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding Daubert to apply only
to novel scientific evidence); Masayesva v. Hall, 118 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); Thorton
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 575, 577 (D.S.C. 1997) (same); Lappe v. American Honda
Motor Co., 857 F. Supp. 222, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (same). This reading is wholly unwar-
ranted.
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of scientific law "such as the laws of thermodynamics," must be
subjected to analysis."'
The Court's sole explanation of scientific method was that
scientific knowledge "implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science. Although the Court did not offer a
description of these methods and procedures, it did outline four
"general observations" to guide the inquiry.2 They are testability,
peer review and publication, error rate, and general acceptance.
These "flexible guidelines" 24 incorporate not only the Supreme
Court's notion of the scientific method but also its assessment of the
importance of peer review to scientists.
1. Testability. Testability, as the Supreme Court emphasized,
is the cornerstone of the scientific method.25 The importance the
Supreme Court gave to the concept of testability reflects its
understanding that credibility in the scientific community is
expressed in terms of a scientist's adherence to these standards.26
Within this concept, the Supreme Court included ideas about
implementing standards for empirical investigation and testing
falsifiable hypotheses. 7 Citing Karl Popper, one of the preeminent
philosophers of science, the Supreme Court explained that
falsifiability was what distinguishes science from nonscience. -28
21 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11.
22 Id. at 590.
' See id. at 594 (characterizing inquiry as a "flexible one").
24 Id.
' See id. at 593 (explaining that "[s]cientific methodology today is based on generating
hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified") (citing Karl Popper, CONJECTURES
AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
2 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. Falsifiability is the term defining the scientific method that
was picked up by the Supreme Court in explaining the concept of testability, much to the
chagrin of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who in the Daubert dissent remarked that he was "at a
loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on
its 'falsifiability' ... " Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
According to Karl Popper, the distinguishing characteristic of a scientific statement is "its
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability." Id. at 593.
27 Id. at 593. As one scientist described the importance of testability: "The goal of
science is the systematic organization of knowledge about the universe on the basis of
explanatory principles that are genuinely testable." Francisco J. Ayala, Biology as an
Autonomous Science, 56 AM. SCI. 207, 207 (1968).
2 Daubert, 590 U.S. at 593. Popper argued that science was distinguishable from other
disciplines-specifically psychoanalysis and economics--because it is possible to devise a test
which would disprove a scientific hypothesis but not an economic one. See KARL R. POPPER,
1052 [Vol. 33:1047
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Other than to state the importance of the concept, however, the
Court was silent on its meaning.29 The Court neither explained nor
gave examples of the testability concept's application.
2. Peer Review and Publication and 3. General Consensus. The
Supreme Court recognized the importance of feedback to scientists."°
The Court explained that submitting an expert's work to the
scientific community is "a relevant, though not dispositive, consider-
ation in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an opinion is premised.""1 Unfortunately,
however, two of the Court's four factors are devoted to social
feedback mechanisms, giving them unwarranted importance and
risking a return to the old Frye standard despite having expressly
overruled it. 2 This overemphasis is problematic because although
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIc DISCOVERY 86 (1959); KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND
REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 36-37 (5th ed. 1989). Other
philosophers of science have disputed this basic assumption, claiming that science, like other
modes of human thought, is fundamentally indeterminate. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (describing history of scientific method). Even
absent the concept of an objectively determinate "scientific method," however, "commitment
in science reaches beyond argument and rests ultimately on agreed-upon procedures." ALAN
G. GROSS, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE 32 (1990).
" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. The Supreme Court recognized that "a key question in
determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier
of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested." Id. Other than a citation to Karl
Popper, linking the definition to "falsifiability or refutability," however, the Court did not
elaborate. Id.
' See id. at 593 C'Submission [of a proposition] to the scrutiny of the scientific
community is a component of 'good science,' in part because it increases the likelihood that
substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.").3' Id. at 594.
' See, e.g., Michael C. Polentz, Post-Daubert Confusion with Expert Testimony, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1187, 1213 (1996) (noting that "the general acceptance test has the
propensity to dominate the threshold gatekeeper inquiry"). Although the Court acknowledged
that publication "is not a sine qua non of admissibility," it gave the factor unwarranted
significance. Id. at 593. As one scientist explained, "The mere fact that research reports are
published, even in the most prestigious journals, is no guarantee of their quality." PETERG.
GOLDSCHMIDT & THEODORE COLTON, THE QUALITY OFMEDICAL LITERATURE: ANANALYSIS OF
VALIDATIONASSESSMENTS INM EDICALUSES OF STATISTICS 370-91 (J.C. Bailor & F. Mosteller
eds., 1986). By discussing publication and peer review-which are forms of consensus-as
something other than and separate from consensus, the Court risked subsuming its other
inquiries into the single issue of consensus. Indeed, despite the dispatch of Frye, courts
continue to place a disproportionate emphasis on consensus. See, e.g., United States v.
Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding admission of fingerprint evidence
because technique was generally accepted, peer reviewed and published, and indicating that
not all Daubert factors must be considered in every case); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
947 F. Supp. 1387, 1406 (D. Or. 1996) (finding testimony inadmissible because unreviewed
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1047
peer review, publication, and general acceptance in the scientific
community clearly affect scientists' evaluation of each others' work,
these factors may have little, if anything, to do with the intrinsic
merits of the research.3 If a scientist's work looks otherwise sound,
there is no a priori reason to dismiss it just because it has not found
favor among the scientist's peers. Similarly, publication, peer
review, and general acceptance do not validate research whose
logical underpinnings are shaky. Many, if not most, articles
published, after having received peer review and a measure of
consensus, are later proven to be wrong.1
4
4. Error Rate. The known or potential error rate of a particular
scientific technique, and "the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation" 5 are crucial
inquiries. 6 Without knowing how often a given procedure yields
mistaken results, it is difficult to assess either the reliability of the
procedure or the validity of the inferences drawn from it."7 Unless
there are standards maintained and observed for the operation of a
based on notion that "[pMeer review and publication weigh heavily in the calculus of the
reliability of expert testimony because such peer review 'increases the likelihood that
substantive flaws in methodology will be detected'" (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593)).
' Publication in science is competitive. Work may remain unpublished and achieve
little acceptance in the scientific community, even though it has scientific merit, simply
because it does not reflect contemporary interests. One recent example is the research of Dr.
Kilmer S. McCully in the field of arteriosclerosis, which went scorned and unpublished not
because of any intrinsic flaw in his research, but because he concluded that a vitamin
deficiency rather than cholesterol alone was responsible for arteriosclerotic plaques. See
Michelle Stacey, The Fall and Rise ofKilmer McCully, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, at 25. This
conclusion was unpopular among scientists, who wanted to alert the public to the dangers of
high cholesterol, and to the pharmaceutical companies, who wanted to sell their anti-
cholesterol drugs. Many years after his research was completed, and after a lifetime of being
castigated by his colleagues, Dr. McCully is now beginning to achieve recognition for his
pathbreaking research.
34 See GOLDSCHMIIDT & COLTON, supra note 32, at 370-91 (reporting that relatively few
journal articles are scientifically sound in terms of reporting usable data and providing even
moderately strong support for their inferences).
35 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
' See Shayne C. Gad & Carrol S. Weil, Statistics for Toxicologists, in PRINCIPLES AND
METHODS OF ToXIcoLoGY 221, 224 (A. Wallace Hayes ed., 3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES AND METHODS] (describing methodologies used in evaluating toxicological data).
' The absence of any error analysis is a characteristic and persistent flaw in much of
what is proffered as criminal scientific evidence, undermining its validity. See Erica Beecher-
Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP.
L. REv. 55 (1998); Paul C. Gianelli, "Junk Science. The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1993).
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given technique, there can be no quality control, making a reliability
assessment impossible. 8
It is therefore striking that the Court gave no guidance as to how
a judge is to determine or evaluate the error rate or to evaluate
controls or possible confounding factors.3 9 Even where experts
provide an error analysis, and good scientists normally provide an
error analysis with their results,, the type of analysis may vary
widely.40 Different scientific disciplines have different ways of
estimating and controlling errors.4' The Court neither acknowl-
edged those differences nor gave the lower courts any clues about
how they should be assessed. Finally, although the Supreme Court
correctly recognized that statistical concepts are important in
assessing the validity of scientific conclusions, it did little more than
mention the issue. The Court's cursory treatment of this factor
made it far too easy for trial judges to ignore and gave too little
guidance to those who wish to effectuate its purpose.
B. DAUBERTAND JOINER ON THE QUESTION OF "FIT"
The Court's express intention in Daubert was to switch the trial
courts' focus from whether the expert's conclusions had garnered a
scientific consensus to whether the expert's techniques and
3 See KARIN D. KNORR-CETINA, THE MANUFACTURE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY ON THE
CONSTRUCTIVIST AND CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF SCIENCE 21 (1981) '[The major task of the
laboratory is to rule out possibilities, manipulate the balance of choices so that one becomes
more attractive than the others, and to up- or down-grade variables with respect to
alternatives."); FRANK C. LU, BASICTOXICOLOGY: FUNDAMENTALS, TARGET ORGANS, AND RISK
ASSMENT 73-86 (1996) (discussing acquisition of data in acute, short-term, and long-term
toxicity studies).
' Controls are unexposed to the agent or procedure in question; confounding factors are
variables related to both the exposure and the result which can therefore obscure the
relationship between the agent and the result. See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue
Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., supra note 8, at 181,214.
40 See KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGEANDTHE FEDERAL COURTS 70 (1997) (discussing various ways to classify scientific
error). As noted above, an exception to this is found in the criminal context, where experts
seldom proffer any error analysis with their studies. See supra note 37.
"' For a concise explanation of how statistics are used in scientific evidence and a
description of statistics as "the science of uncertainty, a body of methods for making
inferences and decisions when faced with fallible observations or other forms of uncertainty,"
see Stephen E. Fienberg et al., Understanding and Evaluating Statistical Evidence in
Litigation, 36 JURiMETRICS J. 1, 3 (1995).
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methodology were valid.42 That does not mean, as the Court later
explained in Joiner, that the trial judge could ignore the expert's
conclusions. 4' Rather, the trial court must examine the expert's
methodology and techniques for consistency with the expert's
conclusions and with the facts of the case at hand.44 Conclusions
and methodology, the Court pointed out in Joiner, are not entirely
distinct from one another, and there must be a valid connection
between them.
45
The Supreme Court's concern with "fit" is well founded in
scientific theory. Observation and interpretation, and the connec-
tion between them, are concerns basic to scientific reasoning.
46
Even if the theory is testable, and the testing was performed
correctly with the proper controls, the question is whether the
experiments really show what they are intended to show.47 In
neither Daubert nor in Joiner, however, did the Court give much
guidance on how to resolve these inherent problems.
The sole example of "fit" in Daubert was the relevance of a study
of the phases of the moon, which the Court explained would be
relevant to whether a particular night was dark if darkness was a
fact in issue but not to whether an individual was likely to have
behaved irrationally on that night.48 The Court's explanation of this
' Initially, the Supreme Court in Daubert recognized that the relevance of expert
testimony depends upon whether the proffered testimony will resolve issues presented in the
legal dispute before the court. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591
(1993). The role of the court, noted the majority, is to resolve factual disputes, some of which
may involve contested scientific evidence. Id. The key question here is whether the proposed
testimony is based on data which "fits" or is validly connected to the facts of the case. Id.
* General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
" Id.
45 Id.
' Epidemiological studies, for example, lack the laboratory control over factors which
may affect the quality of data. Exact determination of exposure levels, for example, is
generally impossible in epidemiological studies, and control over other environmental factors
may be difficult. In toxicology studies, the extrapolation of results from animal studies to
humans may be problematic depending on, among other things, the type of animal used.
KNORR-CETINA, supra note 38, at 21.
"' For example, epidemiologists have developed a set of standards to take these
variables into account. Seegenerally DAVID G. KLEINBAUMETAL., EPIDaMIOLOGIc RESEARCH:
PRINCIPLFS AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS (1982).
' Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,591 (1993). What is valid in one
context to resolve one legal dispute, the Supreme Court observed, may not be valid in
another. Id.
[Vol. 33:10471056
1999] SCIENCE AND INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS 1057
key concept in the Joiner opinion was less cursory but more cryptic.
In upholding the trial court's exclusion of the evidence in Joiner and
reiterating that the abuse of discretion standard applies to Daubert
determinations as well as to other evidentiary rulings, the Supreme
Court reviewed each of the four proffered epidemiology studies and
two animal studies individually and found that none of them "fit"
the plaintiffs experts' conclusions that Joiner's exposure to
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) was an aggravating factor in his
developing lung cancer.49 The opinion fails to explain, however, just
what would make the kind of animal studies that scientists
normally perform relevant to a toxic tort case. It also failed to
explain how an expert may properly rely on numerous studies that
build on each other without having the studies sequentially
excluded as separately inadequate and therefore failing the "fit" of
the case.
The two animal studies in Joiner involved infant mice that were
injected with PCBs through the abdomen.50 These studies not only
varied factually,51 but the plaintiffs experts offered neither any
studies to show any link between cancer and PCBs exposure in
adult mice nor any evidence that any other species exposed to PCBs
developed cancer.52 Thus, according to the Court, the problem was
not the validity of the studies per se but the failure to provide
evidence to link the factually distinguishable studies to the plain-
tiffs disease." Because the experts failed to perfect the analogy
" Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143-45. The foundation for the experts' proffered testimony
consisted of two animal studies and four epidemiological studies. Chief Justice Rehnquist
(who had dissented in Daubert), writing for the majority, explained that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion either in finding that "the animal studies on which respondenes experts
relied did not support his contention that exposure to PCBs had contributed to his cancer" or
in finding that the epidemiology studies on which the plaintiffs experts relied did not"fit' the
conclusions which the experts espoused. Id. at 144.
50 Id.
s The factual differences between Joiner's exposure and the experiments involved the
studies' use of infant mice, whereas Joiner was an adult human; the mice were subjected to
massive doses of highly concentrated PCBs injected directly into their abdomens, whereas the
plaintiff was exposed to much smaller PCB concentrations through his skin and lungs. Also,
the plaintiff developed different types of tumors from the mice. Id.
52 Id.
5 Id.
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they sought to make, their testimony did not meet the requirements
of "fit."5
4
The Court found that the four epidemiology55 studies were
equally flawed.56 Not one of the studies concluded definitively that
PCBs exposure increased the incidence of cancer in the exposed
population.5" Two studies involving workers exposed to PCBs noted
a higher mortality rate among these workers than expected, but
neither could demonstrate a link between the increased mortality
rate and exposure to PCBs.5" A third study of workers exposed to
mineral oil showed a statistically significant increase in lung cancer
deaths in these workers, but the mineral oil was not shown to
contain PCBs and the study expressly limited its conclusions to the
type of mineral oil studied.59 The fourth study involved Japanese
subjects who had been exposed to other carcinogens in addition to
PCBs in the toxic rice oil which they had eaten.60 Because none of
the proffered studies individually supported a conclusion that PCBs
increase the risk of cancer, the Court found they did not "fit" the
underlying hypothesis that plaintiffs' cancer was aggravated by his
exposure to PCBs.61
Thus, although the Court found nothing wrong with the
principles or methodology underlying the individual studies, it found
that each of them failed to support the expert's theory that exposure
to PCBs aggravated the development of the plaintiffs cancer.62 The
majority recognized that there might be an argument that the
combined evidence provided support for the experts, but remarked
that the plaintiff offered neither evidence to show how the studies
were analytically linked nor guidance as to the cumulative impact
of the studies. 63 The Court acknowledged that "[t]rained experts
5' Id. at 144-45.
' Epidemiology is the "study of the occurrence and distribution of disease among
people." Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 39, at 215.
" Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145-46.
657 Id. at 145.
5 Id.
9 Id. at 145-46.
00Id. at 146.
6' Id. at 145.
6 Id.
6 Id. at 144-45.
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commonly extrapolate from existing data," recognizing that experts
may need to rely on a number of imperfect studies to reach a
conclusion.64  The problem with the Joiner plaintiffs expert
testimony, in the Court's view, was that the experts failed to explain
their extrapolations.65 With respect to the animal studies, the Court
explained that the issue was not whether animal studies could ever
show causation in humans but "whether these experts' opinions
were sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they
purported to rely."66
The Joiner Court took an overly-mechanistic view of causation
in upholding the district court's finding that the cancer of a thirty-
five-year-old former smoker with a family history of early deaths
from lung cancer had not been causally linked by the proffered
evidence of PCBs exposure. 7 After all, everyone knows that
smoking causes lung cancer, and everyone knows that genetics are
also important determinants of lung disease. Joiner had both of
these risk factors working against him. Using common sense and
the leeways of the legal tradition, it is not hard to see why the
district court decided Joiner had no case despite undisputed
exposure to toxins.6" He was doomed anyway.
The district court's conclusion may reflect common sense, but it
demonstrates little understanding of probabilistic evidence.69 The
Supreme Court also appears to require precisely the kind of
mechanistic causation that science has long since abandoned.70
" Id. at 146.
M Id. at 146-47.
id. at 144.
o7 Id. at 144-46.
w Joinerv. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310,1324 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd 78 F.3d 524
(11th Cir. 1996), rev'd 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
See infra notes 276-317 and accompanying text (discussing causation theories).
70 See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of
Causation of Cancer and Other Environmental Disease in Individuals, 10 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 33, 34 (1985) (discussing inadequacies of common law in dealing with causation
of injuries related to exposure to hazardous substances).
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Probabilistic evidence is inherently uncertain,7' yet scientists
routinely accept these uncertainties. 2
How the Court rationalized upholding the result is even more
troubling. Unable to say that Joiner was a dead man walking for
fear of opening up tort doctrines such as last clear chance, 73 the
Court engaged in sophistry about the relevance of the proffered
evidence. The question arose on a motion for summary judgment,
and the immediate question before the Court was whether the
proffered evidence was scientifically valid. PCBs are indisputably
linked to lung cancer.74 Thousands of studies show this, forming the
basis of the regulatory ban on PCBs.7 15 Joiner was unquestionably
exposed to PCBs.76 The Court had a problem if it wanted to get rid
of this case so it did so under the aegis of "fit" by refusing to
acknowledge the interrelationship of the vast literature on PCBs (a
great deal of which had been placed in evidence) with the individual
studies proffered.77 It did this by excoriating the experts and, by
implication, plaintiffs' lawyers, for failing to explain how to link the
literature with the studies, and how to extrapolate these studies
from animals to humans and from the humans studied to Joiner.78
71 Id. at 46 C'when a scientist states that a chemical causes cancer, the term cause is
consciously hedged, and used in its most scientific manner").
' For example, toxicologists routinely accept animal data and, in the absence of better
data, in vitro studies of genetic mutations. See, e.g., Philip E. Enterline, Attributability in the
Face of Uncertainty, 78 CHEST 377, 379 (1980).
" Last clear chance is a tort doctrine originating in the mid-1800's and is illustrated by
the English case in which the plaintiff left his ass tied up on the highway and the defendant
drove into it. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 66, at
463 (5th ed. 1984) (citing Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842)). Multiple causation is
an issue that has troubled the courts since well before the upsurge in toxic tort litigation. Id.
§§ 41-42, 65-66. The textbook rule is that liability may be imposed only if a tortious act was
a substantial factor in producing injury. Id. § 41, at271. Determiningwhether a given causal
link constitutes a substantial factor is itself a probabilistic inquiry that has occasioned much
controversy in the courts. Id. § 66, at 462-63.
' Joiner's experts relied on the "studies of at least thirteen different researchers, and
referred to several reports of the World Health Organization," all of which implicated PCBs
in cancer formation. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 151 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75 Id. at 139.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 144-46.
78 Id. at 144.
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Along the way, the Court said all the right things. It acknowl-
edged the admissibility of animal studies for human causation, and
then it found these animal studies deficient, explaining that Joiner's
experts failed to explain the extrapolations properly. 9 The Court
acknowledged that studies ought to be interpreted in conjunction
with each other, but then it found that Joiner's experts failed to
explain how these studies could be linked.8" According to the Court,
the record was simply deficient-it was a lawyering failure.81 As the
dissent points out, however, a perusal of the documents before the
district court reveals that a great deal more information was
submitted in the Daubert hearing than ever made it into either the
judge's opinion or the parties' record.82
Disposing of the case under the aegis of admissibility permitted
the Court to avoid the more troubling issue of whether someone who
has put himself in harm's way can claim that his death resulted
from another equally fatal cause. Can a man playing Russian
roulette be murdered when someone else shoots him at the same
time that his own gun went off? It is a tough question, and one that
a jury might have trouble with, but that does not excuse the Court's
intellectual dishonesty. Had it reached a jury, the proffered
evidence might have been difficult to weigh. That should not,
however, excuse the Court's circumvention of the jury under the
pretext of admissibility.
At its most scientifically defensible, the Court's opinion can be
read to articulate two basic principles. First, experts may rely on
the cumulative evidence of numerous studies, none of which is
precisely analogous, to form the basis of their opinions.8" The Court
found that a single dispositive study is not required, nor is each
study relied on required to support the whole of the expert's
conclusion.84 Despite this pronouncement, the Court excluded the
individual studies piecemeal rather than examining the data in
their entirety.
' Id. at 144-45.
so Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 151 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 146-47.
Id.
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Second, the Court found that animal studies were not categori-
cally excludable.8" The Court acknowledged the importance of
animal studies to toxicology."6 It argued that these studies could be
considered in conjunction with other available data as long as the
expert's extrapolations were explicit and valid."7 Nonetheless, the
Court excluded the animal studies without offering any guidance as
to how a trial judge is to determine when and how experts may
extrapolate and the limitations that ought to be imposed on such
extrapolations.88 Indeed, its discussion was limited to remarking on
the analytical gaps between the proffered toxicology and epidemiol-
ogy studies and the experts' opinions, with no explanation of how
the gaps should have been filled.89 As a result, the issue of "fit" will
undoubtedly continue to plague the courts, particularly with respect
to cumulative scientific evidence.
C. THE TROUBLED PROGENY OF DAUBERTAND JOINER
Although the Supreme Court opinions in Daubert and Joiner
introduced judges to some basic scientific concepts, they left a great
many questions unanswered. How a judge determines whether a
particular experimental method is good science or how a judge
decides whether one type of study is superior to another are open
questions.9" The Supreme Court also failed to acknowledge that the
scientific method is not the same for all scientific disciplines and
that scientific reliability is not an all-or-nothing proposition, but
rather depends on the application of the evidence and the acceptable
risk of error.9" Neither Daubert nor Joiner specifically addressed
the way in which separate studies, each individually inadequate to
support a given conclusion, may cumulatively provide foundation for
86 Id. at 144-45.
se Id.
97 Id.
u Id.
9 Id.
90 For a critique of the indeterminacy of the Supreme Coures opinion in Daubert, see
generally Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What That Means forForensic
Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2103 (1994).
91 See Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law's
Hubris, 43 EMORYL.J. 913,920 (1994) (urging caution in admitting novel scientific evidence).
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a scientifically valid expert opinion. Statistical analyses, although
concededly important to a Daubert determination, were neither
discussed nor explained. Probabilistic causation issues were
ignored.
As a result, post-Daubert examples of courts' mishandling of
scientific evidence abound. 2 This mishandling of scientific evidence
is particularly acute in toxic tort cases where proving causation
nearly always involves the use of scientific experts. The courts'
analyses frequently founder on several major issues. These include
the admissibility and evaluation of animal studies, the impact of
cumulative studies, and the use of statistical analysis.
1. Animal Studies. In broad terms, animal studies are per-
formed by exposing animals to a particular chemical and extrapolat-
ing the results to humans using what is known about the structure,
function, and metabolism of the particular chemical and the
similarity of the actions of the chemical in the animals studied and
human beings.9" Even under the old Frye general acceptance test,94
and despite near unanimity in the scientific community that animal
studies are reliable indicators and useful predictors of human
disease,95 courts have had enormous difficulty accepting the validity
' See generally Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, Whither Daubert? Reliable Resolution
of Scientifically-Based Causality Issues in Toxic Tort Cases, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 563
(1998) (arguing that courts should decide causation rather than juries). In criminal cases, the
issues that plague the courts concern the absence of empirical bases for a wide range of
purportedly scientific identification techniques. Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms
for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1354-55 (1994). In civil cases other
than toxic torts, involving expert testimony from engineers and accountants for example, the
question often surfaces as to whether such evidence should be scrutinized for validity under
Daubert guidelines. Recently, inKumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 67 U.S.L.W. 4179 (U.S. Mar.
23, 1999), the Supreme Court held that expert, non-scientific engineering testimony is also
subject to Daubert analysis.
' See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,974-77; see also D. Cooper Rees & Dale
Hattis, Developing Quantitative Strategies forAnimal to Human Extrapolation, in PRINCIPLES
AND METHODS, supra note 36, 275-315 (presenting at guidelines for extrapolating animal
toxicity data to humans).
" See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that only
"generally accepted" scientific evidence is admissible).
' See, e.g., Arnold L. Brown, The Meaning of Risk Assessment, 37 J. ONCOLOGY 302
(1980) (expressing doubt that anyone "can seriously question the relevance of animal data to
the human experience"); I. Bernard Wasserstein, Mitogenesis is Only One Factor in
Carcinogenesis, 251 SCIENCE 387, 388 (1991) (describing rodent bioassays as an invaluable
tool in assessing carcinogenesis in humans.).
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of testimony that extrapolates evidence about human injuries from
animal studies.9 6 Post-Daubert courts often find expert testimony
based primarily on animal studies inadmissible simply because they
relate to animals rather than to humans." Nonetheless, animal
studies are routinely relied on by scientists in determining toxicity.98
Their wholesale rejection by the courts is unwarranted and reflects
the courts' ignorance of basic scientific precepts.
Moreover, although epidemiologic studies may be the preferred
proof of general causation, they are no panacea.99 Indeed, animal
studies have a number of advantages: laboratory conditions permit
' See, e.g., In re Selwood v. Oxford Chems. Inc., No. 91-5619 (3d Cir. Feb. 21, 1992)
(finding inadmissible expert testimony regarding health effects of hazardous substances based
only on animal studies); Bellv. SwiftAdhesives Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1577, 1581 (S.D. Ga. 1992)
(finding expert testimony based on animal studies insufficient to withstand motion for
summary judgment); Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1348 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (finding
expert testimony on toxic effects of PCBs inadmissible and noting that "jurisdictions are in
disagreement over the admissibility of expert medical or scientific testimony based on animal
studies where the reliability of such evidence is contested"); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding animal studies "of so little probative
force and.. so potentially misleading as to be inadmissible"). Another example is the failure
of the court in Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1521 (W.D. Mich.
1987), to see the relevance of proffered data on metabolic transformation and carcinogenesis
of trichloroethane ("rCE"). Although the plaintiff, who sought damages for exposure to TCE
on a risk of cancer theory, offered expert testimony on the metabolism of TCE, the mechanism
by which exposure to TCE "can increase an individual's susceptibility to cancer," and on
TCE's similarity to the molecular structure of known human carcinogens, the court granted
summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 1521, 1526. This result seems to embody an
unnecessarily restrictive view of the certaintylevel demanded before evidence will be deemed
sufficient. See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(requiring human experiments or epidemiological data); Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs.,
Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1485 (D.V.I. 1994) (finding human studies necessary for admissibil-
ity), affd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994). In spite of its dispositive-sounding dicta about animal
studies, the court in Wade-Greaux actually examined the proffered studies and soundly
critiqued them. Wade-Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1483.84; see also Margaret A. Berger,
Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2124-25, 2145 (1997) (noting courts' difficulties with admitting expert
testimony based on animal studies and proposing shifting burden of proof to defendants in
toxic torts cases).
' See, e.g., Raynor, 104 F.3d at 1375 (requiring human experiments or epidemiological
data); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1397 (D. Or. 1996) (finding animal
studies inadmissible to prove causation in humans unless there are "good grounds to
extrapolate from animals to humans); Wade-Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1430 (requiring human
studies for admissibility); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706,729-30 (Tex.
1997) (rejecting animal studies as unreliable under Texas equivalent of Daubert).
' Berger, supra note 96, at 2124-25, 2145.
99Id. at 2125.
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the researcher to have better control over the experimental condi-
tions; high dosages more accurately reveal the presence of a dose-
response relationship; and the time required to conduct an animal
study is much shorter."l° Where complex exposures are involved in
epidemiological investigations-as in most toxic torts-it is difficult
to define the causal element.'10 Moreover, designing and conducting
a sound epidemiologic study is difficult, time-consuming, and
expensive.12 As a result, such studies are in short supply. 3
Because there are so few good epidemiologic studies available,
animal studies are often the primary source of information regard-
ing the health effects of chemicals." 4
Despite the obvious differences between humans and laboratory
animals, biochemical and metabolic processes carried out in most
organs are similar.' All of the forty or so chemicals recognized to
cause cancer in humans also cause cancer in animals.' 6 There is
10 See Brennan & Carter, supra note 70, at 44 (stating that epidemiologic studies are
more dependent on "probabilistic-type reasoning" than animal studies); Michael D. Green,
Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of
Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw.U. L. REV. 643,654 (1992) (noting advantages
of animal studies over epidemiologic studies).
... See Barbara D. Beck et al, The Use of Toxicology in the Regulatory Process, in
PRINCIPLES AND METHODS, supra note 36, at 19, 23-24.
102 Berger, supra note 96, at 2127-28. Controls among human populations are a more
significant problem than they are under laboratory conditions. See Troyen A. Brennan,
Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-
Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 507 (1988) (noting that researchers cannot
control conditions of epidemiologic studies as well as they can in laboratory experiments).
10" See Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 12, at 532, 565-66 (concluding that despite
scarcity of epidemiologic studies, animal studies should not be admissible, a conclusion with
which this Article takes issue).
"'l See id. at 534. Indeed, for most toxic tort cases, there is a paucity of data, not
necessarily because there is no causation but because many toxic tort cases share a history
of manufacturers' neglect in conducting basic safety research. See Rebecca S. Dresser et al.,
Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 705, 732-34 (detailing
"repetitive pattern of manufacturer neglect' of basic safety research in asbestos, tobacco,
Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, ultra-absorbent tampons, and Bendectin litigation).
10" See Beck et al., supra note 101, at 38; Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary
Drawing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 51 nn.224-27 (1996) (quoting D.P. Rail et
al., Alternatives to Using Human Experience in Assessing Health Risks, 8 ANN. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 335,356 (1987) for the proposition that "there are more physiologic, biochemical, and
metabolic similarities between laboratory animals and humans than there are differences").
log International Agency for Research on Cancer, Preamble, in 63IARCMONOGRAPHSON
THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS To HUMANS 9, 17 (1995).
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typically a close correspondence between the target organ in these
studies and at least one of the animal species studied."7 That is not
to say that differences in metabolism, body size, dose, lifespan, and
other factors should not be considered. Complex issues do exist,
relating to route of exposure, dose-response models, scaling factors,
and cross-species variations.' 8 Nonetheless, with all their atten-
dant uncertainties, scientists routinely rely on these studies,
understanding them as reliable probabilistic statements about
causality.' 9 Courts should not, therefore, categorically reject
animal studies."0
In addition to the wholesale exclusion of animal studies, courts
also appear to founder on extrapolating the results from animal
studies to humans."' The utility of animal studies designed for
1" Id.; see also James Huff Chemicals and Cancer in Humans: First Evidence in
Experimental Animals, 100 ENVT'L HEALTH PERsP. 201, 204 (1993) C'the array and
multiplicity of carcinogenic processes are virtually common among mammals").
" See Brennan & Carter, supra note 70, at 42-44 (discussing complexity of animal
bioassay testing).
100 See id. C'Scientists assume that substances which are carcinogenic in animals are
carcinogenic in humans-an assumption which has been proven time and again when doing
animal bioassays of known human carcinogens.).
"' Despite the major uncertainties in extrapolating (or "scaling") an equivalent dose in
humans, most toxicologists believe that animal studies are reliable predictors of human
toxicity. See NATIONALRESEARCH COUNCIL, RISKASSEssmENTINTHEFEDERALGOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS 22 (1983) (premise that results from animal experiments are
applicable to humans "underlies much of perimeutal biology and medicine").
.. For example, in Nelson v. American Sterilizer Co., 566 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997), the court excluded expert testimony that plaintiffs liver disease was caused by
exposure to chemicals used in sterilizing medical equipment merely because the animal
studies the expert relied on were high dose rather than low dose studies. This appears to be
a fundamental misconception about the usefulness of animal studies. However, this may be
another lawyering failure, as the court does point out that plaintiffs experts provided no
understandable scientific basis for their extrapolations. The failure of the plaintiff in Joiner
to provide the basis for extrapolating the results of the animal tests also appears to be the
basis of the Nelson court's exclusion. The court responded to the plaintiffs argument that it
should not categorically exclude animal studies by pointing out the failure of the expert to
draw a convincing analogy from these studies to human causation. Id.; see General Elec. Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997) (rejecting plaintiffs expert testimony because opinion
was seemingly far removed from animal studies). In the Paoli PCB litigation, the Third
Circuit reinstated the excluded animal studies despite defendants' argument that "test
animals are often very sensitive to chemicals due to... physiological, biological and metabolic
pathways which are different than those of humans." In re Paoli RRYard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717, 779 (3d Cir. 1994). In Paoli, unlike in Joiner, the expert was able to testify that the
animals studied (monkeys, in Paoli) had sensitivities to PCBs similar to humans. Id. at 779-
80.
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regulatory risk assessment in toxic tort litigation is the subject of
ongoing legal debate.112 Physiological differences between the
animals studied and humans (or as one court remarked, "humans
are not rats"'), the high dosages ordinarily used in such studies in
contrast to the low dosages typically at issue in toxic tort cases, and
laboratory conditions are all contentious areas of litigation.
Although there is some validity to these objections, they are not
dispositive." 4 High-dosage extrapolations from animals to humans
are commonly used by toxicologists to provide realistic indications
of causal relationships in humans. This is a cornerstone of scientific
research.1 5 While there are always a few scientists who urge
caution in the wholesale adoption of animal studies, this is a distinct
minority. No modern scientist seriously questions their relevance,
as long as the animal studies are supplemented by information
regarding chemical structure, the manner of chemical absorption,
metabolization, and distribution in the body, and as long as there is
"' See Erin K.L. Mahaney, Assessing the Fitness of Novel Scientific Evidence in the Post-
Daubert Era; Pesticide Exposure Cases as a Paradigm for Determining Admissibility, 26
ENvTL. L. J. 1161, 1183 (1996) (noting that debate centers around "variability in laboratory
conditions, the variety of responses observed within the same and different species of animals,
the administration of extremely high doses, the inherently arbitrary selection of low-dose
extrapolation models, and the unreliability of interspecies extrapolation"). Courts sometimes
categorically reject agency findings for purposes of tort litigation as having been developed
for regulatory (preventive) purposes rather than litigation and thus needing a lower standard
of proof See, e.g., Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
EPA's 'weight of the evidence" methodology). There is little rationale for this bias against
hazard characterization, as opposed to level of exposure methodology, which may have a
preventive bias, since EPA carcinogenic risk assessment explicitly characterizes the level of
hazard gleaned from all the biological information available as "known/likely," "cannot be
determined," or "not likely" to be carcinogenic to humans. See Proposed Guidelines, supra
note 11, at 17,961. Moreover, the EPA uses the same "more probable than not" standard to
reach its risk assessments as is used in civil litigation. See id. I am not arguing that EPA
risk assessments should be adopted as dispositive in toxic tort litigation. Rather, I suggest
that there is nothing inherently biased about the methodology used in reaching the risk
characterization. Cf Ellen Relkin, The Sword or the Shield: Use of Governmental
Regulations, Exposure Standards and Toxicological Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 6 DIcK. J.
ENVIL. L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1997) (cautioning against wholesale adoption of risk assessments
models).
1 International Union v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
14 See Beck et al., supra note 101, at 38 (discussing cross-species extrapolation).
.5 Id. at 22-23.
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a physiologic analogy in the species studied.116 The courts, however,
have not yet caught up with this understanding and often mechani-
cally reject testimony based on animal studies.
2. Cumulative Impact of Scientific Evidence. Science is a
collaborative enterprise, and scientific studies simply cannot be
interpreted in isolation. Scientific studies build upon one another.
Because they ignore this pivotal idea, courts frequently find the
issue of "fit" a difficult determination to make."' Although the
relevance of a single study may be a fairly straightforward determi-
nation, relevance becomes more complicated when a number of
studies are involved, each of which is only marginally relevant, but
which together purport to form the basis of an expert's conclusions.
This is by far the most common situation, particularly in toxic tort
cases. Only rarely will an expert rely on a single study. More often,
many different studies may-and, indeed, should-be offered
cumulatively to support the expert's position, although no single
study could do so on its own.
In Joiner, for example, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's exclusion of the plaintiffs expert testimony on this basis.1 8
It explained that "[o]pinions of any kind are derived from individual
pieces of evidence, each of which by itself might not be conclusive,
but when viewed in their entirety are the building blocks of a
perfectly reasonable conclusion...."" 9 The Supreme Court did not
address this view of the evidence, except to note that the district
116 See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,968; JAMESL. SCHARDEIN, CHEMICALLY
INDUCED BIRTH DEFEcTS 27 (1993) (observing that "not a single chemical exists that is
teratogenic in humans that has not produced malformations in rodents" and noting that
confirming studies in multiple species increases confidence in the results); International
Agency for Research on Cancer, supra note 106, at 17 (stating that all chemicals recognized
to cause cancer in humans also cause cancer in animals); see also Paoli RR Yard PCB Litig.,
35 F. 3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining the "fit' requirement that "in order for animal
studies to be admissible to prove causation in humans, there must be good grounds to
extrapolate from animals to humans, just as the methodology of the studies must constitute
good grounds to reach conclusions about the animals themselves").
"' See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F.3d 278,290 (3d Cir. 1994) (excluding accident
reconstruction evidence as irrelevant); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., No. CY-91-
3015-AAM, 1998 WL 775340, at *139-40 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 1998) (finding too great an
analytical gap between proffered animal studies and causation issue for human plaintiffs).
11 Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524,532 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'g 864 F. Supp. 1310
(M.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
119 Id.
1068 [Vol. 33:1047
1999] SCIENCE AND INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS 1069
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the individual
studies proffered as the bases of the expert testimony could not
support the experts' conclusions 2 ' and that Joiner did not explain
how to link the studies together to show their applicability to his
claims. 121
3. Statistical Analysis. Probabilistic attribution and statistical
analysis frequently confound the courts. 122 Yet, statistical analysis
and probabilistic thinking are key to understanding the validity of
scientific studies. Indeed, probabilistic reasoning is the foundation
of modern science. 12  Epidemiology is meaningless without statis-
tics. 24  Statistical methods are crucial in testing hypotheses,
constructing and using models, and reducing the number of
variables in a system (by use of mean or standard deviation, for
example). 25 The courts habitually misunderstand the difference
between biological significance and statistical significance and the
nature of different types of data. 126 If, for example, a few animals
' See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997).
121 Joiner's brief to the Supreme Court merely argues that "[a]nalysis of the overall
weight of the available data is the very methodology used by the EPA." Brief for Respondents
at 40, Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (No. 96-188), available in 1997 WL 436250. It may be, as Justice
Stevens remarked in his concurrence and dissent, that there existed sufficient studies
cumulatively to support the plaintiffs position-the court of appeals pointed out that the
plaintiffs' experts relied on 13 studies as well as reports of the World Health Organiza-
tion-but only one of the studies made it into the record, and the district court discussed only
the six studies referred to above. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 151 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The majority also remarked on Joiner's failure to explain how and why
the experts could have extrapolated their opinions from the proffered studies. Id. at 144-45.
"2 See, e.g., In re Joint Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (2d Cir. 1995) (confusing
statistical significance with magnitude of risk); see also Brennan & Carter, supra note 70, at
35 (observing that judges are "peculiarly hostile to the sort of probabilistic evidence of cancer
causation that science can now deliver").
12 See Brennan & Carter, supra note 70, at 38 (discussing influence of probabilistic
reasoning in modern medical research).
124 See GARY D. FRIEDMAN, PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 1-3 (2d ed. 1980) (defining
epidemiology).
12 See Gad & Weil, supra note 36, 37, at 223 (discussing functions of statistics).
' See id. at 222 (explaining differences in types of significance); see, e.g., Allen v.
Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting testimony in absence
of statistical significance); Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873 (W.D.
Tex. 1997) (rejecting testimony based on studies failing to show statistical significance);
LeBlanc v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 782, 784 (E.D. La. 1996) (rejecting
testimony due to lack of studies showing statistical significance); Ambrosini v. Upjohn Co.,
No. 84-3483, 1995 WL 637650 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 1995) (rejecting epidemiological testimony
failing to demonstrate a statistically significant association), rev'd 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir.
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exposed to a particular substance develop a rare type of tumor,
there may be biological significance without any statistical signifi-
cance because of the paucity of data. Courts, ignorant of this factor,
nearly always require data with a particular level of statistical
significance.
127
Statistics are descriptive, and the parameters used for the
description are subject to choice. Both the description of the location
of the data and the measure of the dispersion about the location are
chosen parameters. Courts, however, typically treat statistical
statements as though they were immutable laws rather than
descriptive statements. 121 Statistics, like other descriptive endeav-
ors, are subjective, but courts treat statistical statements as though
they were objective.
Another mistake that courts make is the categorical exclusion of
epidemiological studies that do not demonstrate a relative risk of at
least two. 129 The ostensible rationale for this exclusion is that a
relative risk of two indicates that twice as many people in an
exposed group contracted a disease as those who contracted the
disease in an unexposed control group.80 Courts, therefore,
conclude that the affected people in the exposed group "more
1996); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706,724 (Tex. 1997) (rejecting under
Texas equivalent of Daubert test, statistical significance levels other than five percent).
"7 See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145-46 (1997) (affirming lower court's
decision to exclude epidemiologic study for lack of statistical significance); Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1405 (D. Or. 1996) (noting that studies did not support
expert testimony because only one out of 16 found statistical relationship); Hatner, 953
S.W.2d at 724 (requiring statistical significance level of five percent admissibility).
" Cf Brennan & Carter, supra note 70, at 39 (explaining scientises understanding that
"causality is not a simple either/or proposition: the probability that one event caused another
can be increased or decreased depending on how well new evidence fits with the guiding
theory").
11 See, e.g., Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1320-21 (9th Cir. 1995)
(excluding evidence of relationship between Bendectin and birth defects when studies found
relative risks of less than two). Relative risk is the ratio of the risks for exposed and
unexposed people; a relative risk of one means the same risk for exposed and unexposed
people, while a relative risk of two indicates a doubling of the risk for exposed and unexposed
people. Nancy A. Dreyer, An Epidemiologic View of Causation.. How it Differs From the
Legal, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 40, 40 (1994).
" See Cranor et al., supra note 105, at 38 (arguing that it is "error to exclude
epidemiological evidence simply because it reveals a relative risk less than two, unless there
is no other supporting evidence").
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probably than not" contracted their disease through exposure.'31 In
other words, courts excluding studies with relative risks less than
two contend that unless the study shows it is twice as likely that the
agent caused the disease, the study fails to meet the legal prepon-
derance test.13 2 The requirement of a relative risk of two, however,
rests on a misunderstanding of statistics,'3 3 and reflects a misinter-
pretation of the relative risk in terms of posterior probabilities.'34
In terms of posterior probabilities, while it may make sense to
exclude evidence that cannot meet that standard if the plaintiffs are
relying on a single study with a relative risk less than two, it makes
little sense if there are several studies which should be considered
in conjunction."' Atom bomb survivors, for example, exposed to
ionizing radiation (a universally acknowledged carcinogen), show a
relative risk of all cancers taken together (except leukemia) of less
than two.' For courts prone to categorical exclusions, evidence of
a type of cancer other than leukemia would be inadmissible. Such
a result is absurd from a scientific viewpoint.
Meta-analysis of data (or reanalysis, as it is sometimes called)
is also routinely excluded from the courts although it is an often
used tool of epidemiologists. 137  Normally, several studies are
131 Id. at 37.
13 See, e.g., Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320.21 (excluding causation evidence that Bendectin
was capable of causing defects because expert could not testify that relative risk was greater
than two).
" See Fienberg et al., supra note 41, at 9 (noting that "requirement of a relative risk of
two... rests on a misinterpretation of statistical methodology).
' See id. at 9 n.27.
" See Sander Greenland, Preface, in EVOLUTION OFEPIDEMIOLOGICIDEAS: ANNOTATED
READINGS ON CONCEPTSAND METHODS 14 (Sander Greenland ed. 1987). Epidemiologists often
refer to Hill's criteria in assessing causation. See Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and
Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PRoC. ROYAL SOCY MED. 295, 299 (1965) (setting out
nine aspects of statistical association between two variables that ought to be considered in
assessing causation). Relative risk is important according to these criteria, but Hill cautioned
against dismissing a causal hypothesis merely because the observed association appears to
be slight. Id.
'3 H. KATO, CANcERMoRTALiTYINATOMIc BOMB SURVIVORS (. Shigematsu &A. Kagan,
eds. 1986).
13 The plaintiffs' experts in Daubert used meta-analyses as the foundation for their
conclusions, and the Ninth Circuit, on remand, ultimately found it to lack scientific validity.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1312,1320-22 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that in order to correct methodological errors, experts would have to change conclusions
altogether).
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required to reach any conclusion about the effects of a given
chemical. Meta-analysis, which averages the results of many
individual studies, is a way of reducing sampling error' 8 by
increasing the size of the sample.'89 Meta-analysis is often used to
identify subtle effects of drugs in clinical studies. 40 Statistical
reanalyses of data are also widely accepted tools in epidemiology.' 4 '
This technique offers a means of comparing and synthesizing
studies dealing with similar health effects and risk factors.' The
appropriate use of meta-analysis is to "enhance understanding of
associations" between chemical exposure andits effects on people.'
Even if properly done, however, meta-analysis is not appropriate if
there are too few studies available or when the available studies
yield insufficient information about disease and exposure.'"
Assuming that the technique is properly implemented, one major
difference between meta-analysis and other scientific methods is
that in a properly performed meta-analysis, the underlying
assumptions and model choices are explicit and identifiable,
whereas in the latter the choices are often implicit and intuitive.
145
Thus, the courts' wholesale rejection of meta-analysis has little
scientific justification.
4. Conflation of Admissibility with Sufficiency. In a toxic tort
case, the plaintiff must prove causation by a preponderance of the
" Sampling error, sometimes called random error, refers to the difference between the
estimate of a particular characteristic in a population and the true value. David H. Kaye &
David A. Freeman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 8,
at 331, 407.
'3 See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 40, at 80 (discussing use of meta-analyses in
epidemiological studies).
140 Id.
"" See, e.g., Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,974 ('Statistical re-analyses of
data, particularly an examination of different exposure indices, can give insight on potential
exposure-response relationships."); A. Blair et al., GuidelinesforApplication ofMeta-Analysis
in Environmental Epidemiology, 22 REG. TOXICOLOGYPHARMACOLOGY 189, 189-97 (1995); J.
Peto, Meta-analysis of Epidemiological Studies of Carcinogenesis in Risk Assessment, 116
IARC SCI. PUBS. (1992).
14 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,974.
143 Id.
144 Id.
1 Fienberg et al., supra note 41, at 14.
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admissible evidence. 4 This is only one of several legal standards
that comes into play when assessing causation evidence. The
proponent must also persuade the judge that the proffered evidence
is more likely than not scientifically valid.4 7 Then there is the
Daubert standard, which requires only a scintilla of scientifically
valid and relevant evidence in order to survive an admissibility
determination. 48 How these legal standards ought to be interpreted
is far from clear and is an argument that predates Daubert by a
considerable margin.' Dauber, and Joiner have, however, muddied
the waters.
In the traditional tort case, proving causation means the
factfinder must be more than fifty percent confident that, having
heard both sides of the story-including the scientific evidence
supporting each side--the defendant's act or product caused the
plaintiffs harm.5 ' The standard does not require, however, that
judges first decide whose evidence is most persuasive and exclude
evidence pointing the other way.'5' That is the jury's function. Nor
should the court in an admissibility determination weigh the
gravamen of the parties' proffered evidence against each other to
determine whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving
party. That is the question of sufficiency.5 2 Yet, this mistaken
' See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (3d ed. 1984); Green, supra note 100, at 680-81
C'plaintiffs should be required to prove causation by a preponderance of the available
evidence, not by some predetermined standard that may require nonexistent studies").
14' See Michael Hoenig, Expert Testimony by Physicians, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1998, at 3.
' See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
, At least since Hart & Honore'a critique ofHume's causal chain analysis, legal scholars
have debated the meaning of causation in tort law. See H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORE,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 80 (1959).
'" See D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of
Persuasion, 73 CORNELLL. REV. 54, 55 (1987) (noting that "in principle, a verdict for plaintiff
is justified if an idealized judge or jury, given the parties' evidence, finds that the probability
that the plaintiffs story is true exceeds some threshold figure").
"" See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Ark.
1996) (excluding scientific evidence in context of plaintiffs suit against pesticide manufac-
turer); see also Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 377 (1986) (observing that use of
statistical probabilities of causation, as necessitated by epidemiological studies, has caused
courts to conflate burdens of proof and standards of persuasion).
152 As the Supreme Court explained, "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for ajury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). "Merely colorable" or "not significantly
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conflation of sufficiency with admissibility is widespread among the
federal courts.'53
The issue is rendered more confusing because, in Daubert
hearings, the causation issue frequently surfaces in the context of
a dual motion challenging the admissibility of expert testimony and
moving for summary judgment.5 4 If the expert affidavits submitted
to defeat the motion for summary judgment are deemed inadmissi-
ble under Daubert, the motion will be granted and the case dis-
missed.55 Thus, the first inquiry must be whether the testimony is
scientifically valid. Once this determination has been made, the
second inquiry is whether the totality of the defendant's evidence is
sufficient to establish causation. Courts, however, including the
Supreme Court in Joiner, conflate the inquiries finding testimony
inadmissible because it is insufficient to support causation. Only if
the "scintilla of evidence presented... is insufficient to allow a
reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not
is true" may the judge grant summary judgment or direct a
probative" evidence will not withstand summary judgment. Id. On the other hand, the court
is not to weigh the evidence in making this determination but is to make all inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 249. If, after all, there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case, the court may grant summary judgment. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,325 (1986). If the plaintiffs theoryis so implausible that a jury could
not rationally accept it, summary judgment may be proper. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). For a thorough discussion of summary
judgment standards and the increasing misuse of summary judgment in federal courts, see
Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999).
' See Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding expert
testimony insufficient to allow jury to find causation due to analytical gap between evidence
and inferences); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., No. CY-91-3015-AAM, 1998 WL
775340, at *140-41 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (finding unacceptable analytical gap between animal
studies and proffered inferences); National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F.
Supp. 1490, 1530 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (granting defendantfs motion to exclude expert testimony
since plaintiffs failed to establish that "proffered expert's causation evidence meets scientific
admissibility standards"); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare, Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1398 (D. Or.
1996) (excluding expert testimony which fails to state causal connection in terms of
probability or certainty); Thomas J. Mack, Scientific Testimony After Daubert: Some Early
Returns From Lower Courts, TRIAL, Aug. 1994, at 23, 28-30 (reporting holdings on
admissibility issues in federal courts).
I" The causation issue in Joiner, for example, arose on defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd 78 F.3d
524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
6 See id. at 1326 (finding expert opinions inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert and
therefore granting defendants' summary judgment motions).
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verdict.' Nothing in the Daubert opinion warrants conflating the
two inquiries. 1
57
In Daubert, "fit" is a relevancy, not a sufficiency, problem. 58 In
Joiner, however, Justice Rehnquist turned the question of "fit" into
a sufficiency issue by sequentially excluding the studies relied on
and then finding the resulting testimony insufficient to withstand
summary judgment. 59  This approach is at odds both with the
Daubert test of "fit" which required only minimal relevance
(testimony about the phase of the moon could be admissible to show
degree of darkness)'60 and with the minimal logical relevance the
federal courts require in other contexts. It is also contrary to the
explanation of the rule given by the Advisory Committee note for
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 which warns against conflating
sufficiency with admissibility.' 6' Conflating the two standards is
pernicious because it precludes a cumulative impact analysis, the
very kind of analysis that is the most scientifically reliable.'62
Daubert explicitly separated the two considerations.' 6 The real
question for admissibility is whether each of the proffered studies
is methodologically sound and contributes toward a biologically
plausible theory of causation.'64 The question of sufficiency, on the
other hand, is whether all the party's evidence taken together
makes a plausible causation argument.165 Sequentially excluding
" Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
'7 See Polentz, supra note 32, at 1207.
"M See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
" Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141-43.
'eo See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (requiring "valid scientific" connection).
6 FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
16 See Edward J. Imwinklereid, Daubert Revisited. Disturbing Implications, 22
CHAMPION 18,25 (1998) (citing Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1397 (D.
Or. 1996) as an example); see also Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative Value:
Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 439, 473 (1994) (arguing that admissibility
rules ought to be interpreted to incorporate principles of probabilistic inference so that if
evidence A is ruled to be inadmissible as unhelpful, a litigant may proffer evidence B to gain
admission of A, and the trial court may consider beth A and B together).
£63 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
' Imwinklereid, supra note 162, at 20.
' See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The
question on summary judgment is whether, accepting the nonmoving party's inferences as
true, a reasonable jury could find causation more probable than not. See Beiner, supra note
152, at 97 (arguing for a summary judgment standard similar to that used in sexual
harassment cases). It is up to the jury to decide whose causation argument is more plausible.
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bits of evidence as individually unable to support causation as a
whole is unjustified both intellectually and procedurally.166 It is a
travesty of intellectual due process.
III. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER GUIDELINES
Perhaps foreseeing the difficulties post-Daubert courts would
have making the required scientific validity determinations, the
Federal Judicial Center crafted its own guidelines. 6 ' It was
intended as an introduction for judges who are untrained in the
various fields that are frequently the source of expert testimony,
and it contains basic guides to epidemiology, toxicology, survey
research, DNA evidence, and statistics. The guides explicitly do not
purport to instruct judges on the admissibility of various types of
evidence. 6 ' Instead, they provide a primer on the methods and
reasoning of these various disciplines and suggest questions that
enable judges to identify disputed issues. 69 Each of the guides is
written, at least in part, by scientists from a particular discipline. 7 '
Useful as it is in providing concise guidance on principles and
methodologies, the Reference Manual offers no unifying theme. It
gives no perspective on the scientific enterprise, instead presenting
science as a series of discrete studies. 7 ' Even an astute reader
would be hard-pressed to discern a common thread. Unfortunately,
presenting judges with fragments of the methodological details of
particular disciplines has limited utility. 2 Certainly, in designing
Id.
i See Beiner, supra note 152, at 81 (noting that the Supreme Court rejected the
piecemeal exclusion of hostile work environment evidence in sexual harassment cases in favor
of a "totality of the circumstances" analysis).
167 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 8.
1 Id. at 3. These guides "are intended to assist judges in identifying the issues most
commonly in dispute in these selected areas and in reaching an informed and reasoned
assessment concerning the basis of expert evidence." Id.
'69 Id. at 3.
170 For example, the Reference Guide on Toxicology has two authors, a toxicologist and
a lawyer. Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 39, at 181.
"" See Conley & Peterson, supra note 9, at 1189 (observing that "science is not a
conglomeration of discrete 'studies' but rather a coherent approach to analyzing the world").
172 See GROSS, supra note 28, at 4 (observing that "[s]cientific knowledge consists of the
current answers to three questions, answers that are the product ofprofessional conversation:
what range of 'brute facts' is worth investigating? How is this range to be investigated?
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experiments, scientists should avoid methodological (and logical)
fallacies. It is helpful to identify some of the problems. Judges,
however, are nor in the business of designing experiments, rather,
they are in the business of assessing the validity of imperfect
experiments presented to them as evidence.'73 This problem is not
addressed.
Although the Reference Manual does illustrate some of the major
flaws that scientists attempt to avoid in designing a study, it is
silent on the methodologies employed by scientists to assess
completed studies. The Reference Manual does not explain that
imperfections are unavoidable, and it does not illuminate the
relative importance of various methodological failures. What is a
minor flaw, and what flaw renders a study useless? The Reference
Manual simply does not say. Thus, despite their usefulness in
understanding the concerns of particular disciplines, the guidelines
offer little assistance on this issue. This is unfortunate since
principles of general application help to clarify the process of
assessing scientific validity.'74 The Reference Manual does not
assist decisionmakers in understanding the nuanced process of
evaluating imperfect information. 175 Judges and lawyers need a
more interdisciplinary approach, emphasizing the importance of the
connection between scientific topics.
What do the results of these investigations mean?').
17 The experiments judges hear about in their courtrooms are imperfect because no
experiment is ever designed or executed perfectly. Although worth striving for, perfection is
an elusive goal. Judges who insist on perfect studies are demanding the impossible. Indeed,
a study that is too perfect is as suspect as one that is full of flaws. Cf infra notes 341-348 and
accompanying text.
174 See GROSS, supra note 28, at 7-8 (discussing "stasis theory" of rhetoric in analysis of
scientific explanations).
17' Identifying the common methodological flaws and fallacies one is likely to encounter
in a particular discipline is useful, but all methodologies are flawed and no studies are
perfect, thus the inferences drawn from particular studies are only more or less apt. The
trick is determining whether a particular inference will withstand scrutiny. How flawed is
too flawed? This can be assessed only in connection with other similar studies. See infra
notes 295-304 and accompanying text. The point is not whether the judge can make the
ultimate decision on the aptness of the inference but that there is a good basis for the
inference.
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IV. EPA GUIDELINES
In contrast to both the Supreme Court's sketchy attempts to
enlighten lower courts on what makes scientific assertions well
grounded and the Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual,
which fails to illuminate a common underlying thread, the EPA has
developed guidelines for agency administrators that attempt to
provide a more comprehensive and scientifically justifiable frame-
work for analysis." Like Daubert decisions, the EPA's scientific
validity determinations are judicially reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. 7 ' Just as trial courts must justify admissibility
determinations to appellate courts, agencies must also justify
regulatory decisions on the basis of reasonable inferences from
reliable evidence.7 8 The EPA's risk assessment model recognizes
the difficulty of explaining which inferences are reasonable and
which evidence is reliable, thus, its framework may offer valuable
insight into the issue of scientific validity even if the model is not
adaptable in toto to judicial admissibility decisions.
As an initial matter, many courts reject out of hand the notion
that agency decisionmaking has any relevance to judicial determina-
tions of admissibility.1 ' The primary reason that these courts give
for their outright rejection of agency process is that it is "too
speculative."' This mistaken attitude reflects the courts' arrogance
and ignorance of the underlying principles and the process by which
176 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11.
'77 5 U.S.C. § 702(2)(A) (1994) (directing courts to review agency determinations to
ensure that they are not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with the law").
"7' See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968-69 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (ruling that although an agency's interpretation of equivocal facts should be given
deference, a court must "carefully review the record to ascertain that the agency has made
a reasoned decision based on 'reasonable extrapolations from some reliable evidence.' "),
vacated in part 421 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
179 See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996); Wade-
Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc. 874 F. Supp. 1441 (D.V.I. 1994), affd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir.
1994).
" See, e.g., Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196-98 (5th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting plaintiffs expert witness's "weight of evidence" analysis); Conde v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting plaintiffs use of EPA draft technical support
document); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., No. C4-91-3015-AAM, 1998 WL 775340,
at *140-41 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (rejecting agency weight of evidence analysis).
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agency decisions are made. Administrative agencies need realistic
risk assessments in order to know which chemicals to regulate.'8 1
If anything, agency decisions are weighed even more carefully than
judicial ones because they have far-reaching effects." 2 Thus, while
agencies may legitimately require that the level of exposure be set
low in order to guard the public health, this does not mean that they
will regulate a chemical without probable cause.' 8 There are
powerful political and market forces acting against such unwar-
ranted regulation. 1
84
The EPA's proposed guidelines acknowledge the importance of
considering all available evidence in deciding whether a given
chemical causes disease.'85 In order to decide whether a substance
(an "agent") causes cancer (is "carcinogenic") or birth defects (is
"teratogenic"), the agency examines all available evidence, including
human and animal studies regarding the way a particular agent
works at the cellular and subcellular levels, as well as evidence of
general metabolic processes and the way that certain toxins affect
the body.' The EPA refers to this kind of assessment as a "weight
of the evidence" assessment. 87  The International Agency for
..1 See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,965-66, 17,999.
18 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 1027, 1067 (1990) (noting restraints on agency action).
183 Id.
184 SeeFRANKP. GRAD, 4BTREATISEONENVIRONMENTALLAW (1998); TroyenA. Brennan,
Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21-42 (1993) (discussing political and market forces
impeding regulation); Gillette & Krier, supra note 182, at 1058-70 (detailing anti-regulation
forces).
1"2 See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,960; see also Guidelines for Develop-
mental Toxicity Risk Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798, 63,816 (1991) (emphasizing
importance of evaluating data from all available studies in making risk assessments).
1 See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,961.
187 Id. The agency term "weight of the evidence" should not be confused with the legal
evidentiary consideration of weight which really means credibility and is determined by the
fact-finder, as distinguished from an admissibility decision which the judge makes. The use
of identical terminology does not signify a common meaning. The EPA's "weight of the
evidence" standard simply means that the decisionmaker must weigh the cumulative impact
of all available information. Id. In law, a judicial determination that a particular factor
affects the "weight of the evidence" (rather than its admissibility) simply means that the
factfinder is the proper decisionmaker. Judges frequently have difficulty deciding whether
the proffered evidence is inadmissible or whether it is admissible but insufficient. See, e.g.,
National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (excluding
evidence as insufficient).
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Research on Cancer' and the National Toxicology Program'8 9 use
a similar approach in evaluating scientific evidence of disease
causation.' 90 This approach acknowledges that the decisionmaker
will have to assess causation based on imperfect knowledge by
weighing what is known with inferences derived from general
knowledge about the disease and agent.191
A. ANALYZING THE AVAILABLE DATA: THE FOUR PRONGS OF
ASSESSMENT
The EPA Proposed Guidelines outline a method for realistic
decisionmaking in the face of imperfect knowledge.192 For this
purpose, the guidelines offer a series of default assumptions that
vary according to the purpose of the assessment,' and they outline
"a combination of principles and process in the application of and
departure from default assumptions." 94 The guidelines emphasize
the importance of making assumptions explicit and in giving the
rationale for a particular decision.'95 The process is referred to as
a "weight of the evidence" assessment because it acknowledges the
importance of analyzing all the available data, as opposed to
" The International Agency for Research on Cancer, part of the World Health
Organization, is considered one of the premiere scientific bodies for identifying disease in
humans. Bruce N. Ames, The Causes and Prevention of Cancer: TheRole ofthe Environment,
CA51 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 49, 58 (1995).
189 See National Toxicology Program, National Institute ofEnvtl. Health Science, Review
of the Criteria and the Process for Preparing the Biennial Report on Carcinogens Completed.
Changes Effective Immediately, in NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM UPDATE 3 (1996).
"S See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,964.
191 Id.
'9 Id. at 17,960. As one scientist explained:
All scientific work is incomplete-whether it be observational or
experimental. All scientific work is liable to be upset or modified by
advancing knowledge. That does not confer upon us a freedom to
ignore the knowledge we already have, or to postpone the action that
it appears to demand at a given time.
Hill, supra note 135, at 295.
19 The guidelines recognize that in assessing public health risks, the assumptions should
be conservative, and that other circumstances may require different assumptions. Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,965.
194 Id.
19 See id. (recommending that"EPA should consider adopting principles or criteria that
would give greater formality and transparency to decisions to depart from defaults").
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excluding some sources of information. A weight of the evidence
assessment of scientific validity should not be confused with the
weight of the factual evidence at trial. The latter is a function of the
factfinder, whereas the former is a function of the validity finder
who, after Daubert, is the judge. Perhaps a better way of describing
this analysis is a cumulative impact analysis, as the technique
involves assessing the cumulative impact of many separate bits of
information on the validity of an expert's conclusion. Although the
baseline assumptions may differ for agency and judicial
decisionmakers, what is important, in either instance, is that the
decisionmaker identify the default assumptions and explain the
choice and that the choice of default assumption makes sense. This
is what I call intellectual due process.
196
1. Default Assumptions. Incomplete information is
inescapable.197 Scientists must, and frequently do, use studies that
leave out important information or that are flawed in some way.'98
To assess the validity of these flawed studies as building blocks for
their own uses, scientists employ a number of default assump-
tions.'99 This is the same process used by the EPA. -00
The major default assumptions listed by the Guidelines provide
ways to answer each of the following questions. First, can the
presence or absence of effects in one human population predict
effects in a different human group?20 Yes, says the EPA, and most
'" See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and IntellectualDue Process,
107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998) (discussing decisionmaking procedures used to evaluate scientific
expert testimony).
' Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,964.
'" See GROSS, supra note 28, at 47 n.6 (giving example of bending of light in a
gravitational field, a crucial test of general relativity). Gross explains that although the data
exhibited a scatter far wider than normal canons of proof would allow, the "elegance" of the
theory convinced physicists more than any notions of falsifiability. Id. In other words, the
interpretation of the data was a creative act that built upon the work of others and might
have differed in other circumstances. Id. That does not mean, however, that everything is
.up for grabs." What it means is that judges interpreting scientific studies need to
understand the context in which these studies proceed.
19 See id. at 47 (discussing theory of falsifiability).
See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,966 (discussing major default
assumptions commonly utilized in cancer risk assessments).
2' Id. at 17,966-67.
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courts agree.212  Second, can animal studies predict effects in
exposed humans?.. Yes, says the EPA, because "nearly all of the
agents known to cause cancer in humans are carcinogenic in
animals";2 4 the courts are divided on this issue.205  Third, do
metabolic pathways relate across species? 206 Yes, according to the
EPA,20 7 but most courts never get this far in their analyses.
20 8
The fourth default assumption relates to whether the way toxins
affect the body can be extrapolated across species.209 Yes, if
differences in size are accounted for, according to the EPA.210
Moreover, in the absence of contrary data, the EPA assumes that
2 Id. at 17,967; see, e.g., Wade-Greauxv. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441,1451-
53 (D.V.I. 1994), affd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994). The EPA cautions, however, that "this
assumption could still underestimate the response ofcertain sensitive human subpopulations
.... " Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,967.
o Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,967-68. The EPA asserts that the basis for
this default assumption is not health conservatism but models that scale metabolic rate
across animals of different size. Id. at 17,967. This is similar to the issue of dose-response
relationships which similarly assume a linear response in the absence of contrary data. Id.
2 Id. This is also true of birth defects. See Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk
Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798, 63,801 (1991) (observing that nearly all agents that are
teratogens in animals are also teratogenic in humans although converse is not necessarily
true, as discovered in the Thalidomide fiasco-Thalidomide was not teratogenic in rodents).
' See Conde v4 Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809,814 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that draft
relying on animal studies is "not probative of medical causation by its own terms"); see also
supra notes 93-116 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty ofcourts in accepting validity
of testimony extrapolating evidence about human injuries from animal studies). When an
animal study shows no effects, the EPA's default assumption is that there will be no effect on
humans. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,967. This is not a conservative policy
EPA recognizes, since there are a number of chemicals--such as arsenic-which are toxic to
humans but not to animals. Id.
Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,968.
Id. This is not true with respect to birth defects, where interspecies differences in
gestation times and other factors means that the effects will vary. Guidelines for Develop-
mental Toxicity Risk Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. at 63,801 (noting that although "there is
usually at least one experimental species that mimics the types ofeffects seen in humans, but
in other species tested, the type of developmental perturbation may be different"). This leads
the EPA to assume that "the types of developmental effects seen in animal studies are not
necessarily the same as those that may be produced in humans." Id.
Compare General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997) (excluding animal
studies but not finding that they are per se inadmissible) and National Bank of Commerce
v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1523 (excluding animal studies), with In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 779-81 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding proffered animal studies
admissible).
" Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,968.
210 Id.
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the route of exposure is not material; the courts are divided.21'
Fifth, the default assumption asks whether observed dose-response
relationships can be correlated to lower doses.212 In the absence of
specific data to the contrary, the EPA assumes a linear response, an
approach it considers inherently conservative;213 in contrast, most
courts simply reject evidence based on high dosage studies as
inapplicable to low dose exposures. 214 A final default assumption is
one which the EPA recognizes as problematic-and which may not
be appropriate for the courts-is whether benign tumors can be
correlated with disease.1 5 Some benign tumors later become
cancerous and some do not. In the absence of data, the EPA
assumes they can be correlated. 216 Most courts never reach this
issue, but as a policy matter they could correctly reject this position
as public health conservative.217 On the other hand, even develop-
ment of benign tumors is evidence of disease other than cancer and
therefore may have important implications for human health.
The use of default assumptions is justifiable in legal terms as a
form of rebuttable presumption.2 1  Although scientists recognize
21 Id. This is in marked contrast with the courts, which frequently insist on a similar
route of exposure before finding studies admissible. See, e.g., Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145-46
(finding animal studies inadmissible); Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp
1441, 1482-84 (D.V.I. 1994) (same), aff'd 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994).212 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,968-69.
22' Id. The EPA explains that a corollary assumption is that a high dose of an agent
received over a short time is equivalent to a low dose spread over a lifetime. Id. This too is
a conservative assumption. Nonetheless, it is a workable assumption even for judicial
decisionmakers because, as the Reference Guide on Toxicology explains, the use of realistic
doses in animal studies leads to "a significant loss of statistical power, thereby limiting the
ability of the test to detect carcinogens or other toxic compounds." Goldstein & Henifin, supra
note 39, at 190.
2,4 See, e.g., Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146; Wade-Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1484.
2"5 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,972.
216 Id.
217 In Joiner, for example, although the Supreme Court mistakenly referred to the
affected mice as having "cancer," it may have been substantively correct in refusing to equate
their alveologenic adenoma-a benign lung tumor-with human lung cancer. Joiner, 522
U.S. at 144. The Court may have correctly discarded the mouse studies but for the wrong
reason-not because the cancers were of different types but because the mice did not develop
cancer at all. Id.
"sI See Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding
Alternative MethodsforPresentingandAssessingScientific Evidence in Common Law Courts,
51 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 69-70 (urging adoption of scientifically sound rebuttable presumptions
by courts in toxic tort cases).
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that their assumptions may not hold true in every instance, they are
more often than not correct. Thus, absent information to the
contrary, these assumptions should be employed. With few
exceptions (notably the benign tumor extrapolation), the EPA's
assumptions are scientifically sound and make good policy sense for
the courts. Although regulation may require a smaller incremental
risk than tort liability requires, in terms of the methods and
assumptions for assessing the validity of scientific studies, agencies
and courts have similar goals.
2. Hazard Assessment. The purpose of hazard assessment is to
review and evaluate data that is pertinent to answering first
whether an agent poses a hazard to humans, and second, under
what circumstances the hazard may be expressed.219 The point of
this assessment is to examine the "biological story the data reveal
as a whole about carcinogenic effects, mode of action, and their
implications for human hazard dose-response evaluation."22 The
key inquiries in such characterizations include what the agency
calls the conditions of expression, that is, the route of exposure, the
metabolic pathways of the agent, the kinds of toxic effects it
exhibits, and a comparison of these metabolic processes in humans
and animals.22' In making this characterization, the EPA interprets
available data on the increased incidence of disease. 2 in humans
and animals exposed to the agent as well as any other epidemiologi-
cal studies, animal studies, and data describing the chemical
structure, physical properties, and function of an agent.2 '
3. Dose-Response Assessment. Because nearly every chemical is
harmful at some dose and harmless at very low doses, the concept
of dose is extremely important in assessing toxicity. 224 In order to
determine the maximum tolerated dose, that is, the dose above
which one would expect to find disease, the EPA tests for "[t]he
highest dose that causes no more than a ten percent weight
219 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,972.
2W Id.
221 Id.
2 Id. Usually tumor incidence is studied in carcinogen assessments, whereas birth
defects are studied in teratology.
22 Id. at 17,977.
224 SeeATEXTBOOKOFMODERNTOXICOLOGY2 (Ernest Hodgson & Patricia E. Levi eds.,
2d ed. 1997).
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decrement, as compared to the appropriate control groups, and does
not produce mortality, clinical signs of toxicity, or pathologic lesions
... that would be predicted to shorten the animals' natural life
span."22 The maximum tolerated dose is determined by extrapolat-
ing from short-term (usually thirty to ninety day) mammal
studies.226 In order to perform this extrapolation from high dose
effects observed in test animals to estimate possible low dosage
effects in humans, the EPA Proposed Guidelines require an explicit
dose-response analysis.227 In the absence of contradictory informa-
tion, the agency uses the default assumption of a linear dose-
response; that is, the more of a particular agent an animal is
exposed to, the proportionately higher the incidence of disease.22 s
Here, the key inquiry is the relationship of the dose to the intensity
of the observed response."2 The EPA's preferred models are based
on general concepts of mode of action and data on the agent.30 In
other words, although the best dose-response models are built on
actual data about how a given chemical acts in the particular
species of animal or in the human body to which it was adminis-
tered,23' the data are almost always incomplete. 23 2
If no exposure was actually observed, as is likely in environmen-
tal exposure and in most litigated toxic tort cases, the EPA recog-
nizes that the dose-response relationship must be extrapolated. The
extrapolation usually has three aspects: from high to low doses,
from animal to human responses, and from one route of exposure
(i.e., skin absorption, inhalation, or ingestion) to another. 33 When
adequate data are available, the EPA suggests extrapolating the
Id. at 304 (citing Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11).
Id. at 473.
2" See id. at 17,975-77.
2" Id. at 17,993. In other words, no dose, no response; increased dose, increased
response. The Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment acknowledge that a
linear response model should not be used if there are data showing nonlinear responses
(where, for example, there is a threshold below which there is no observed effect, or where
there are individual differences in sensitivity, or where a combination of chemicals acts in
concert-like asbestos and tobacco smoke). Id. In those nonlinear response situations the
EPA uses a margin of exposure analysis. Id.
2 Id. at 17,992.
230 Id.
23 Id.
23 Id.
2mId. at 17,992.
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doses used in animal studies to equivalent human doses using
information on the way a particular chemical reacts in the human
body.2"4 When such information is lacking, the EPA recommends
using a default assumption of a linear relationship between dosage
and body weight.3 5 Thus, in order to characterize a dose-response
relationship, the dose data, the response data, and the extrapolation
procedures must be analyzed.3 6 Typically, the assessment must
identify the kinds of data available and account for and explain
choices made with respect to these data. It must also explain the
analysis in terms of the quality and quantity of the available data.
In addition, the dose-response characterization must discuss the
implications of variability in human susceptibility and the applica-
bility of results to the route of exposure, dose rate, frequency, and
duration.3 7
4. Risk Characterization. The purpose of risk characterization
is to integrate the assessments of hazard, dose-response, and
exposure in order to make risk estimates for various scenarios.
2 8
This assessment is used by the EPA as a basis for regulatory
decisionmaking and calls for an explicit evaluation of all of the
available information.23 9 A similar integration could--and should--be
outlined in a trial court's written opinion.240
2 Id. at 17,996.
2 Id. at 17,997 ("the default assumption [for oral exposure] is that delivered doses are
related to applied dose by a power of body weight"). When extrapolating from animals to
humans, the Guidelines note that the dose-response relationship andinter-species variability
in sensitivity (and among people) means that while reducing the dose should reduce the risk,
dose level has no effect on variability. As a default assumption to account for inter- and intra-
species variation, the Guidelines use a factor of 10. Id. at 17,994.
23 Id. at 17,998.
2 Id. at 17,999.
2W Id.
2W Id.
' Contrary to traditional practice, where trial courts do not generally issue written
opinions with respect to evidentiary rulings, the results of Daubert hearings are widely
reported. Indeed, in order for a reviewing court to undertake an abuse of discretion review,
there must be an adequate record and an adequate explanation of the trial courts decision.
This standard is very similar to the required review of agency determinations which
mandates explicit explanations of decisions supported by an adequate record. Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112 (1992). This evidentiary standard is commonly referred to as the
"substantial evidence on the record" standard, and it ought to be used for Daubert
determinations.
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In making its risk characterization, the EPA explicitly exhorts
its administrators to avoid unrealistic estimates of risk.241 Thus, the
EPA's risk characterization process should not be lightly dismissed
by judges.242 The goals of the proposed guidelines' risk characteriza-
tion are "transparency in... decisionmaking, clarity in communica-
tion, consistency in core assumptions and science policies..., and
reasonableness." '243 These goals are not inapposite for judicial
decisionmaking.
B. APPLICABILITY TO JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
Many courts244 and scholars 245 object to judges making the
2"1 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,999. Although the EPA recognizes that it
is appropriate for a regulatory agency to err on the side of protecting health and the
environment, its policy is to make assumptions as realistic as possible. Id.
242 In GeneralElectric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), for example, the Supreme Court
all but ignored national and international environmental agencies' risk characterizations of
PCBs.
24 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,999.
244 See, e.g., Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196-98 (5th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting plaintiffs experts' "weight of evidence" methodology); Conde v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting plaintiffs reliance on EPA draft document
in favor of epidemiologic studies finding little evidence of adverse health effects); In re
Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., No. CY-91-3015-AAM, 1998 WL 775340, at 140-41 (E.D.
Wash. 1998) (rejecting agency weight of evidence analysis); Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs.,
Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, passim (D.V.I. 1994) (rejecting plaintiffs experts' non-epidemiologic
based evidence), affd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994). Judges frequently decline to use data that
were developed for risk assessment purposes because they are concerned about the
conservative default assumptions that may be employed by regulatory agencies seeking to
prevent disease. See, e.g., Conde, 24 F.3d at 814; Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 1998
WL 775340 at *140-41. This concern may be unwarranted in the face of the EPA's Proposed
Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment which specify that causation estimates should not
be unrealistic. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,999. Moreover, this concern can be
addressed by using less conservative default assumptions for litigation purposes.
24 See, e.g., Gerald W. Boston, A Mass.Exposure Model of Toxic Causation. The Content
of Scientific Proof and The Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181 (1993) (finding
that courts are correct in requiring higher level of proof of causation from plaintiffs in toxic
tort suits than for regulatory agencies issuing regulatory rule); Landau & O'Riordan, supra
note 12, at 550 (arguing against permitting use of animal toxicity studies to prove causation
in litigation); cf. Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful EnvironmentalRiskAssessment,
19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 431 (1995) (contending that because a weight of the evidence
assessment requires judgment about validity of inferences, it is beyond the EPA's expertise).
But see Carl F. Cranor, The Normative Nature ofRisk Assessment- Features and Possibilities,
8 Risim HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVT. 123 (1997) (arguing that risk assessment is and ought to
be acknowledged as a normative endeavor and is, therefore, an appropriate decision for the
courts).
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assessments referred to by the agencies as "weight of the evidence"
assessments, arguing that although preventive measures can be
justified on imperfect knowledge, judicial decisions should not be
based on anything less than certainty. 246 This position, however,
assumes that regulatory decisions made with the goal of preventing
harm to human populations can afford to ignore the costs of
regulation on industry.141 It also overlooks the great care with
which regulatory risk decisions must be made.248 If anything, the
decision to regulate is more weighty than a judicial decision because
it has far greater impact. 41 Moreover, requiring judicial decisions
to be made only on the condition of perfect knowledge requires more
certainty than is either possible or legally necessary.250 Scientists
know that insisting on certain knowledge about a given agent is
251 Tems
unreasonable and unnecessary. The most that can be expected
from science is a probabilistic assessment of association between
cause and effect.
Probabilistic assessments inherently employ assumptions.252
Scientists understand that employing default criteria like the EPA's
does not make the results less valid. On the contrary, such
assumptions are inescapable. There maybe arguments about which
assumptions are appropriate, making it important to explicitly state
which assumptions are employed. In addition to the default criteria
inherent in any probabilistic assessment, the default criteria used
by the EPA for assessing risk are solidly grounded in scientific
process and are commonly used by toxicologists and epidemiologists
' See, e.g., Allen, 102 F.3d at 196; Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison Co., 967 F. Supp.
1437, 1448 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing In re Agent Orange Products Liability Litig., 597 F. Supp.
740, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Weinstein, J.)); Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, 892 F. Supp. 756, 773
(E.D. Va. 1995).
U7 See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 184, at 21-42 (detailing care that goes into regulatory
decisionmaking process).
m Id. at 21-42.
249 See, e.g., FRANKP. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1998).
o See Cranor et al., supra note 105, at 17 (observing that "courts have excluded sound
scientific evidence with some regularity in toxic tort cases").
25l See, e.g., Enterline, supra note 72.
2 See Brennan & Carter, supra note 70, at 47 (explaining that uncertainties inherent
in scientific studies do not make them illegitimate).
1088 [Vol. 33:1047
1999] SCIENCE AND INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS 1089
in evaluating each others' work. 53 These default criteria are thus
an important guide for the courts.
Not only is the degree of certainty required by many courts
incompatible with probabilistic assessments, but such certainty is
not legally mandated.254 Legal causation has always been a policy
issue. 55 First year torts students learn that causation is "ultimately
a hodge-podge of various policy considerations, to which different
courts assign various 'weights' in various cases."256 There are a
number of contexts outside of the toxic torts arena in which courts
routinely shift the initial burden of production and, more rarely,
25725persuasion. Warrant rules such as res ipsa loquitur258 shift the
2 See, e.g., Damian Shea, Ecological Risk Assessment, in A TEXTBOOK OF MODERN
TOXICOLOGY, supra note 224, at 446.
2u See Green, supra note 100, at 687 (noting that requiring statistically significant
evidence is at odds with the indifference between false negatives and false positives mandated
by the preponderance standard); Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability and Warranted
Factfinding, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1075,1080 (1996) (remarking that"attaining 'full' or'absolute'
knowledge is generally not possible in law, and is certainly not required for factfinding).
' As all law students who have encountered Palsgraf are aware, causation itself is a
matter of policy. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1737-
39 (1985) (noting that legal realists critique of proximate cause has not resulted in a "policy-
neutral account of actual causation"). As a policy matter, the level of certainty required by
many courts acts as a perverse disincentive to manufacturers in terms of producing
information about the risks of their products. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 104 (detailing
history of manufacturer neglect of basic safety testing in breast implant cases). One attempt
to circumvent the causation problem resulting from information gaps is the "failure to warn"
standard of liability which requires plaintiffs to show that an injury occurred and that the
injury resulted from an information failure for which the defendant was responsible.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIITY § 2 (1997). Despite this standard,
courts still insist on an unreasonably high level of certainty to establish causation. See Aaron
D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of
Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL L. REV. 607 (criticizing Restatement standard because it
fails to ameliorate problem of high level of proof required to show causal link between failure
to warn and resulting harm).
25 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 649 (1998). Prosser, grandfather of torts law, treats causation as a
"thin shell] into which a variety of policy judgments could be poured." Id. at 689 (citing
KEETONETAL., supra note 73); see also Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 29, 33 (1972) (observing that"the dominant function of the fault system is to generate
rules of liability that... will bring about.., the efficient level of accidents and safety");
Steven Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L.
& ECON. 587, 596 (1985) (showing that causation policies vary depending on standard of
liability employed).
"' The best known of these presumptions is res ipsa loquitur in which the burden of
production-and occasionally the burden of proof-is shifted from the plaintiff to the
defendant. See KEETONETAL., supra note 73, §§ 39-40, at 242-62 (describing cases invoking
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burdens away from the plaintiff in recognition of the plaintiffs lack
of access to the evidence.259 Decisions about the types of evidence
that are sufficient to be considered "helpful" to the jury are also
policy choices.26
Indeed, requiring that all the information gaps be filled in order
to go forward is not only a scientific impossibility, but it also places
a perverse disincentive on manufacturers' investment in safety
testing.26 ' Because any information gained from research may be
used against the manufacturer in litigation, a minimum of evidence
is produced. Neither industry nor government adequately funds
research on potentially toxic substances.2 62 No toxicity data exist for
nearly eighty percent of the chemicals in use.26  There simply is no
res ipsa loquitur). Courts often require higher standards of proof, such as clear and
convincing evidence, when factual issues trigger protective questions for one of the parties.
See Walker, supra note 254, at 1119 (giving as examples cases where there is "possible
deprivation of individual rights, a special danger of deception, or a particular type of claim
disfavored on policy grounds"). Another example is the "lost chance" tort cases, where some
courts alter causation theories in order to avoid the injustice of forcing the plaintiff to prove
that but for the defendantgs actions, the plaintiffhad a greater than 50% chance of surviving.
See, e.g., Werner v. Blankfort, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 232-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing
range of recent positions on causation taken by courts); Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405, 413-
15 (N.J. 1984) (employing "substantial factor" causation rather than "but for" causation).
' Res ipsa loquitur, roughly translated, means "the thing speaks for itself' and refers
to circumstantial evidence that the kind of injury sustained does not generally occur in the
absence ofnegligence. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 73, § 39, at 244. The policy behind this
presumption is that the evidence is more readily available to the defendant than to the
plaintiff, a policy equally applicable to toxic tort cases, where the manufacturers have far
greater access to information about their products than do plaintiffs.
2w Id.
' Legal actors need to understand that "the interpretation of uncertainties in and
around... scientific models has been seen as a scientific matter, for scientists alone to
resolve, when actually it is a process riddled with social and political implications." Brian
Wynee & Sue Mayer, How Science Fails the Environment, 138 NEW ScI. 32, 33 (1993)
(discussing role of uncertainty in science and regulatory decisionmaking); cf. Miller & Rein,
supra note 92, at 575 (observing that "difference between the trial and appellate courts in
Joiner could be viewed as a dispute over whether courts or juries should evaluate the
proffered expert's ability to close the analytical gap between existing scientific knowledge and
causality necessary to justify relief').
" See Dresser et al., supra note 104, at 731 (noting that many toxic tort cases share
history of manufacturer neglect in conducting basic safety research); cf. Brennan, supra note
184, at 6-7 (observing that a very "weak deterrent signal" is sent by toxic torts litigation to
manufacturers, making it economically feasible to ignore costs of exposing public to harmful
products).
2 See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 773, 780 (1997) (citing National Research Council Report of 1984).
26 id.
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incentive for manufacturers to produce evidence that may eventu-
ally be used against them in court. 64 It is more cost effective to
abstain from conducting any research that is not absolutely
necessary to appease the regulators.2 6' And any positive informa-
tion generated, whether or not it is based on solid research, makes
valid research showing adverse effects appear more controversial
than it is.26 6 Indeed, there is evidence that the tobacco industry
routinely paid investigators to publish highly biased reports
favorable to the industry for exactly that reason.26 7 Moreover, even
the small amount of research which manufacturers do support is
suspect because of the potential for bias. Scientists have expressed
concern for years that manufacturer support of research may bias
the results.268
Not only do manufacturers have little incentive to engage in
research on their own (or to fund the research efforts of others), but
any assumption that regulatory agencies insist on testing in order
to keep harmful products off the market is simply unwarranted.269
The tobacco, asbestos, DES, ultra-absorbent tampon, Agent Orange,
breast implant, and Bendectin litigation all involved products that
either were inadequately tested or which continued to be marketed
2 See, e.g., Wade Roush et al., Publishing Sensitive Data. Who Calls the Shots, 276
SCIENCE 523 (1997) (reporting dispute between researcher funded by industry and supporting
manufacturer in which researcher claimed that his negative research on outbreak of lung
disease at textile mill was suppressed under confidentiality agreement signed with textile
company).
' Notably, Bendectin was marketed for years without being tested for safety in
pregnancy. See Berger, supra note 96, at 2146-47 (describing Merrell's development of
Bendectin).
2 For example, the tobacco industry paid scientists to write pro-tobacco letters, which,
for a considerable time, kept the tobacco issue from being litigated. See Scientists Wrote Pro-
Tobgfco Letters, ARK. DEM. GAZEtrE, Aug. 5, 1998, at 3A.
20 See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST 1 (1993) (arguing that conflict of interest is huge problem in medicine); Andrew L.
Stone, FDA Congress Mixes Harsh Medicine, 269 SCIENCE 1038 (1995) (observing that
"conflict of interest is a real problem" in science). There have also been cases of outright
fraud as described in United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 1985), where
toxicologists falsified product safety data by underreporting animal morbidity and mortality
and by omitting negative data and conclusions.
No pre-market testing on humans is required for environmental chemicals and
agents. Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 39, at 193. As a result, less than one percent of the
approximately 75,000 chemicals used in commerce have been tested for safety. Id. Even
fewer chemicals have been subjected to epidemiological studies. Id. at 194.
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after testing revealed adverse outcomes.27 ' Thus, the common
argument against using a weight of the evidence approach based on
the differing goals of courts and agencies-the goal of regulatory
agencies is to keep harmful products out of circulation, whereas the
goal of the courts is to assess liability for any harm caused by
products that have already passed the initial regulatory hurdle-is
misplaced.271 Harmful products are not always kept out of circula-
tion. Once in circulation, the courts' insistence on evidence that
does not exist stymies the proper functioning of the tort system.
If government regulation aims to protect public health and
prevent frivolous litigation, and if the tort system seeks to force
manufacturers to internalize the costs of accidents and accident
prevention, then good pre-marketing research should be encouraged
rather than discouraged.27 2  Permitting toxic tort plaintiffs to
demonstrate causation through a weight of the evidence approach
provides manufacturers with such an incentive. 7' Requiring trial
courts to address each of the factors and the assumptions they rely
on gives the reviewing courts an opportunity to evaluate the trial
court's rationale for abuse of discretion. A weight of the evidence
approach is aimed at reconstructing a causal explanation of disease
from whatever sources are available. Thus, with some modifica-
tions, this is an appropriate approach for the courts. 4
270 Id. at 194 (noting repetitive pattern of manufacturer neglect in researching product
safety). For example, Bendectin was marketed in 1957 as an anti-nausea drug for pregnant
women before any reproductive studies had been done. It continued to be marketed without
any substantial testing until the late 1970s even though the manufacturer's experience in the
1960s with thalidomide should have put it on notice that drugs taken by pregnant women can
have disastrous effects on their babies. Berger, supra note 96, at 2144.
"' See Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196-98 (5th Cir. 1996)
(describing different aims of regulatory law and tort law); National Bank of Commerce v.
Associate Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 942, 960 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (same); In re Joint
Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1029-30 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y.
1993) (same), reo'd 52 F.3d 1124 (1995).
2 See Dresser et al., supra note 104, at 708 ('the goal should be to promote good
research earlier in the product development process... [to] protect public health and avoid
unfounded litigation more effectively").
" See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1613, 1687 (1995) (observing that a "rational manufacturer with fiduciary obligations
to shareholders... is thus unlikely to undertake research voluntarily").
' See Cranor et al., supra note 105, at 53 (discussing use of animal toxicological data
in making inferences about effects of various agents on humans).
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A caveat is in order. Although the EPA has much to offer courts
that make decisions about scientific evidence, the EPA's Proposed
Guidelines cannot be adopted in toto. First, many of the guidelines
are geared to assessing the risks of cancer and birth defects,
whereas courts may face a much broader array of diseases.275
Second, many, but by no means all, of the default assumptions
employed under conditions of uncertainty are more protective of the
public health than may be appropriate in courts charged with
assessing the validity of the evidence. Therefore, the Guidelines
need to be adapted and modified in order to be useful in judicial
admissibility determinations. Nonetheless, the Proposed Guidelines
offer a model for intellectual due process which can be useful to the
courts and fair to litigants. Taken together with an understanding
of the underlying theoretical basis for scientific decisionmaking, the
Proposed Guidelines may be helpful in resolving scientific issues
presented to the courts.
V. MELDING SCIENCE WITH LAW: THE CAUSATION CONUNDRUM
In one respect, scientists and jurists are thoroughly divided by
a common language: the conundrum of causation. Judges insist
that something either causes disease or it does not.276 Scientists
understand the matter differently. 7 For a scientist, it is a matter
of statistical attribution.278 If something is statistically correlated
with an increased risk of disease, it may be said to "cause" the
disease. 9 Statistical explanations of causation are fundamental to
7 For example, toxic tort plaintiffs have claimed damages for such injuries as blindness
(Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998); Golod v. Hoffman La Roche, 964
F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)); damaged immune systems (Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996)); respiratory problems (Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91
F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996)); and headaches (Treadwell v. Dow United Techs., 970 F. Supp. 974
(M.D. Ala. 1997)); among others.
"6 See, e.g.,Moore, 151 F.3d. at 277-79 (excluding causation evidence relating to toluene
exposure); Wright, 91 F.3d at 1107 (dismissing formaldehyde injury claims for plaintiffs
inability to demonstrate causation); Schmaltz v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp.
1119, 1122 (N.D. IlM. 1995) (dismissing herbicide exposure case for failure to come forward
with sufficient causation evidence).
2" Brennan & Carter, supra note 70, at 47.
21 See WESLEY C. SALMON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE 57 (1967)
(discussing mathematical theories of probability).
2'79 Id. at 38-39.
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
modern science. Probabilistic causation means that contingencies
and assumptions are inextricably bound up in theory."' 0 Causes
may be connected with events, but this is because "our theories
connect them, not because the world is held together by cosmic
glue. 281
A. PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION
A scientist's determination of causation is not an either/or
proposition but a probabilistic evaluation which depends on how
well all of the available evidence fits together with the underlying
theory. The probability of causation can increase or decrease
depending on what evidence is available.282 Although the choices
about the appropriate degree of conservatism to employ in making
a decision about causation may vary with the context, scientists are
already very conservative since scientific analyses are oriented to
rejecting false positives.28 3
It is important to remember that association of agent and
disease does not prove causation even under the best of circum-
stances-even, for example, in a well-conducted epidemiological
study.284  The results of scientific studies can only tell us how
frequently exposure would be associated with disease as a matter of
= See, e.g., PATRICK F. SUPPES, THE STRUCTURE OF THEORY 186 (1976); PATRICK F.
SUPPES, A PROBABILISTIC THEORY OF CAUSALITY (1972).
281 NORWOOD RUSSELL HANSON, PATrERNS OF DISCOVERY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 64 (1958).
' See Brennan & Carter, supra note 70, at 38-39 (discussing development of
hermeneutic analysis of science that recognizes the concept of probabilistic causation).
" Scientists attempt, whenever possible, to control and eliminate inaccuracies. Id. at
n.158. In addition, scientific studies explicitly attempt to minimize Type II (Beta) error, the
probability of failing to reject a false hypothetical. THEODORE COLTON, STATISTICS IN
MEDICINE 128 (1974). To accomplish this, scientists demand 95% confidence intervals and
corresponding p-values of 5% before they consider their studies to have statistical
significance. Gad & Wel, supra note 36, 37, at 222-23.
' See Linda A. Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CTR., supra note 8, at 121, 126 C'An association identified in an epidemiological study may or
may not be causal."). With respect to the correct diagnosis of disease, one court noted, "ITihat
everyone who has eaten bread has died may tell us something about bread, but not very
much." Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 410 (5th Cir. 1981).
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chance. Probabilities help to decide whether an association between
two variables exists.2 85
Statistical significance is a statement about the frequency with
which a particular finding is likely to arise by chance.286 Confidence
limits indicate the values within which a certain percentage of all
data is likely to fall.287 Hypothesis testing, testing the hypothesis of
some effect against the null hypothesis of no effect, consists of
determining if two or more groups of data differ from each other at
a predetermined level of confidence.288 If a study shows statistical
significance, the null hypothesis should be rejected.28 In other
words, the association is unlikely to be due to chance.290 Lack of
statistical significance means that the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.29' It does not mean that there is no association.
Biological significance and statistical significance are not the
same, and sometimes they are at odds.292 Even without statistical
significance, the results of a study may be biologically significant, as
with a toxicology study that reveals a rare tumor type appearing in
more animals than expected but in too few to be statistically
significant.293 The availability of a variety of studies in different
disciplines that show an association between an agent and a disease
2 See Mervyn Susser, Falsification, Verification and Causal Inference in Epidemiology:
Reconsiderations in the Light of Sir Karl Popper's Philosophy, in CAUSAL INFERENCE 33, 39
(Kenneth J. Rothman ed. 1988).
2N Id.
2 Id. at 40.
' Gad & Weil, supra note 36,37, at256-57 (explaining importance of hypothesis testing
in toxicology research).
' The null hypothesis assumes that there is no association of exposure to disease.
Susser, supra note 285, at 39.
-9 Id. at 39-40.
28 Id. at 40.
See Gad & Weil, supra note 36, 37, at 255-56 (setting out differences between
statistical and biological significance).
"3 See id. at 261-62 (setting out example used in text); see also supra notes 126-127 and
accompanying text (discussing courts' requirement of statistical significance for admission of
scientific studies). Clinical chemistry parameters provide examples of a situation where
statistical significance may be found without any biological significance. The reason for this
is that biochemical parameters are rarely independent of each other. Where damage is
commonly associated with an increase in three biochemicals, for example, a statistically
significant rise in just one may be biologically meaningless. See Gad & Weil, supra note 36,
37, at 254-61.
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permits scientists to make valid causal inferences without achieving
statistical significance.294
Thus, scientists recognize that multiple confirmatory studies in
different disciplines reinforce the conclusions of a single study.
295
Biologically-based descriptions seek to describe the critical events
along the causal pathway between exposure and effect.296 In order
to do so, all available information must be assessed. There is no
scientifically justifiable basis for excluding information from any
chemical, cellular, or animal source that aids in this assessment.297
Not only should all available information be evaluated, but
excluding everything but human (epidemiologic) studies for
causation is a policy rather than a scientific determination. 98
Scientists recognize that all living organisms share a common
biology.299 This common biology leads to marked similarities in the
responsiveness of subcellular structures to toxic agents.30 Nearly
all of the chemicals recognized to cause cancer in humans also cause
cancer in animals."0 ' The target organs of animals and humans are
frequently the same in these studies.30 2 Moreover, animal studies
are often superior to the available epidemiologic data available
because of the lack of controls endemic to epidemiologic studies, the
difficulty in designing and analyzing such studies, and their
costliness.03 Although animal studies require extrapolation to
Bailey et al., supra note 284, at 126.
23 Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 39, at 212.
2 Rees & Hattis, supra note 93, at 275, 309 (describing one strategy that may be used
in dealing with uncertainty in risk assessment process).
' See id. (observing that ideal mix of information to provide complete biological
explanation "would include pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of the effect and its
relation to the level and duration of existing exposures as well as differences in susceptibility
within the exposed population" but acknowledging that such information is rarely available).
See Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 39, at 201.
See id. (noting that"[a]mong mammals, more than sufficient common organ structure
and function readily permits the extrapolation from one species to another in most cases").
Of course, any fundamental differences in organ structure or function between the studied
species and humans need to be considered. For example, rats do not have gallbladders so
they cannot be used to test the effects of chemicals on human gallbladders. Id.
See id.
301 See International Agency for Research on Cancer, supra note 106, at 17.
w See Huff, supra note 107, at 204.
See Berger, supra note 96, at 2128 (arguing that courts' insistence on epidemiologic
studies affects outcome since epidemiologic studies are costly and take time to design,
implement, and analyze). Requiring epidemiologic studies has scientific implications because
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human beings, such extrapolation is a routine part of scientific
analysis.0 4
As noted above, judges have trouble accepting the uncertainties
of probabilistic thinking.0 5 But these uncertainties are unavoid-
able: although the correlation between animal data and human
effects is widely accepted in the scientific community, there will
always be gaps in knowledge. 06 The exact mechanism of
carcinogenesis is still unknown..30  Background rates of a given
disease in the general population--like cancer--make it more difficult
to establish a causal linkage between exposure to a potentially
disease-causing agent and a disease.3 8 Further, because empirical
experiments on humans are seldom possible, for ethical or feasibility
reasons,30 9 many levels of uncertainty persist in epidemiological
research.310  These uncertainties although acknowledged by
it ignores the fact that such studies are prone to design errors and interpretive disputes. This
unfairly skews the toxic tort system in favor of defendants. Id.
o Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,967. Regulatory agencies typically place
greater weight on animal studies than they do on epidemiologic studies because animal
studies are better controlled. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 40, at 133. Extrapolations must
be properly performed, and all parts of a given methodology must be followed. Itis important,
therefore, that the expert be able to explain the basis for the extrapolation used. Assuming
that the extrapolations are explained and properly performed, however, there is no reason
categorically to exclude animal studies.
6 See supra notes 122-136 and accompanying text.
See SAMUELS. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER (1978) (arguing that the politics of
research funding often determines the paucity of experimental data that would link animal
studies to human carcinogenesis).
' See, e.g., Chemical Carcinogens: A Review of the Science and Its Associated
Principles, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,372, 10,379 (1985) (acknowledging that scientists "still lack an in-
depth understanding of the mechanism and stages of cancer induction and expression").
See Green, supra note 100, at 647 & n.20 C"At best, epidemiology assesses the
likelihood that the agent caused a specific individual disease.").
See Alvin R. Feinstein, Scientific Standards in Epidemiologic Studies of the Menace
of Daily Life, 242 SCIENCE 1257, 1257 (1988). Dr. Feinstein further observes "the public and
nonepidemiologic scientists are confronted by evidence that is peer group.approved but
scientifically inadequate" and suggests that "investigators will have to focus more on the
scientific quality of the evidence, and less on the statistical methods of analysis and
adjustment." Id. For purposes of evaluating scientific evidence, however, it is crucial to know
the statistical assumptions used.
310 Scientific notions of causation encompass the concept of uncertainty. For example,
scientists do not like to say that a particular chemical "causes" cancer; they say there is a
causal link or a high degree of correlation. Particularly in developing scientific areas, such
as toxicology, all knowledge is contingent and subject to continual revision. Indeed, according
to Feyerabend, it is precisely the "active interplay of various tenaciously held views" that
accounts for growth in scientific knowledge. Paul Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist,
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scientists, are accepted as inevitable. 11 More knowledge will not
cure the dilemma. There will always be uncertainties: that is the
nature of probabilistic reasoning. The uncertainties do not invali-
date the studies in the minds of scientists.312 Judges, on the other
hand, are frequently paralyzed into inaction by the same uncertain-
ties. But waiting for certainty is like waiting for Godot 13-- an
unnecessary exercise in existential angst.
Further, no matter how persuasive epidemiological or toxicologi-
cal studies may be, they do not show individual, specific causation
although they might enable a probabilistic judgment about the
association between a particular chemical exposure and human
disease on a population level.1 4 This clarifies an important
consideration underlying any scientific evidence: attributing
causation for a particular individual is not a scientific but a legal
in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 197, 209 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave
eds., 1970) ("it is the invention of new ideas and the attempt to secure for them a worthy place
in the competition that leads to the overthrow of old and familiar paradigms"). Legal actors
simply cannot sit back and wait for science to sort itself out: science is continually sorting
itself out. In retrospect, anomalies--those inconvenient (though valid) experimental
results-have been continually piling up around the edges of accepted paradigms. See KUHN,
supra note 28, at 121. When enough anomalies occur, scientists are challenged to account for
them. The coherence of the theories which account for anomalous results and the
methodologies employed are the stuff of scientific argument. Legal actors must be able to
assess coherence in order to decipher the argument. For an enlightening description of the
use of toxicology evidence in tort cases, see generally Ellen K. Silbergeld, Jurisprudence and
Toxicology, in COURTS, HEALTH SCIENCE AND THE LAW 374 (1991).
SI See KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 89-97, 125 (1986) (confounding
factors should be identified in data analysis). Most epidemiology studies provide data
showing an effect over various exposure levels in the subjects. Ideally, confounding factors,
such as age, socioeconomic factors, dietary factors, and smoking, should all be taken into
account. Id. at 90.
31 Indeed, epidemiologists rely on a number of operational criteria which explicitly
acknowledge the probabilistic nature of the risk which is attributable to a specific exposure.
See DAVID G. KLEINBAUM ET AL., EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES AND QUANTITATIVE
METHODS 32-34 (1982). These operational criteria, first articulated by Sir Austin Hill,
include: 1) strength of association in statistical terms; 2) dose.response effect, with a higher
frequency of disease at higher doses; 3) temporality: hypothesized cause must precede
disease; 4) consistency of findings with other studies; 5) biological plausibility: support of the
theory from biological sciences; 6) coherence (with regard to the natural history of the
disease); and 7) specificity of association: disease rare outside of the exposure. Id. These
factors must be considered together, rather than as a checklist. Id.
313 With apologies to SAMUEL BECKETT, WAITING FOR GODOT (1954).
314 Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrat-
ing Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 429, 431 (1983).
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finding.315 Even if epidemiologists and toxicologists are able to
identify correlations between exposure to a given chemical and a
disease, their summary statistical statements apply only to the
group studied, not to the individual members of the group. 1 '
Nonetheless, an overall assessment of the probabilities enables
rational decisions even under conditions of uncertainty.317
B. BURDENS OF PROOF
Some commentators have attributed the causation conundrum
to the differing burdens of proof in science and law.318 In law, the
civil standard of "more probable than not" is often characterized as
a probability greater than fifty percent.3 19 In science, on the other
315 See Brennan, supra note 102, at 512 ('Individual attribution involves uncertainty,
because the epidemiological data produce only summary statistics applicable to the sample
or to the population the sample represents").
316 Id.
317 See, e.g., KLEINBAUM, supra note 312, at 32-34 (discussing general criteria to assess
extent to which evidence supports causal interpretation); Alfred S. Evans, Causation and
Diseasae A ChronologicalSurvey, 108 AM.J.EPID. 249,249-58 (1978) (discussing development
of concepts of causation in infectious diseases and analogizing to legal terms).
318 See CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING
CHALLENGES 28 (1993) (noting that "decisions that appear to be based on 'bad' science may
actually reflect the reality that the law requires a burden of proof, or confidence level, other
than the 95% confidence level that is often used by scientists to reject the possibility that
chance alone accounted for the observed differences").
"' See Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof,
66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 451 (1986) C'[t]he preponderance of the evidence standard is thought to
mandate a verdict for the plaintiff whenever his case as a whole is more likely than not (i.e.,
has a greater than .50 chance) to be true"). A number of scholars argue that this is a
mischaracterization, that what is really meant is that the decisionmaker has been persuaded
to believe the proponent, whatever the probability of the event at issue. See, e.g., ALVIN
PLANTINGA, WARRANT: THE CURRENT DEBATE 3-5 (1993); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of
Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373,416(1991) (advocating focus on ordinal rather than
cardinal proof rules); Walker, supra note 254, at 1078 & n. 14 (stating cardinal interpretation
of preponderance standard is ill-advised). For the opposite point of view, see David H. Kaye,
Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 66 B.U.
L. REV. 657, 672 (19813) (arguing for cardinal interpretation). The Supreme Court explained
that the goal of the legal preponderance standard is to force the litigants to "share the risk
of error in roughly equal fashion.m " Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390
(1983) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). Professor Walker argues that
the goal is not really the equal distribution of errors, but the equal treatment of similar
evidence. See Walker, supra note 254, at 1109 (explaining that "the errors will not be
distributed equally... unless the proportion of plaintiff verdicts equals the proportion of
meritorious cases"). Professor Walker argues that the real reason for choice of preponderance
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hand, the most widely used standard is a ninety-five percent
confidence interval (corresponding to a five percent level of signifi-
cance or p-level). 2° Both sound like probabilistic assessments. As
a result, the argument goes, civil judges should not exclude scientific
testimony that fails scientific validity standards since the civil legal
standards are much lower.3 2' This argument is wrong in several
important respects. First, its factual premise is questionable. Most
excluded scientific evidence is not excluded because it fails to meet
statistical significance tests but because judges fail to appreciate the
inevitably uncertain nature of scientific proof and because they
refuse to assess all of the available data. In other words, they
require a higher standard for validity than scientists do by exclud-
ing studies that scientists routinely include in their analyses. And
even for the small subset of studies rejected for failing to meet the
requisite level of statistical significance, the argument misappre-
hends the proper basis for admissibility: not because scientific
standards are too high but because judges are iusisting on stan-
dards that scientists recognize to be impossibly high.
More importantly, equating confidence intervals with burdens
of persuasion is simply incoherent. 22 The goal of the scientific
as the civil standard is that courts are dependent on the parties to produce evidence, and in
this institutional context, the use of a mid-range decision value for factfinding creates an
incentive to produce adequate evidence. Id. at 1114.
This 95% confidence level is the criterion which study data must meet before the
scientist may reject the possibility that the results are due to chance. See Brennan, supra
note 218, at 24 (defining confidence interval as "the range within which a study parameter
lies 95% of the time").
32 CfCARLF. CRANOR, REGULATINGTOXIC SUBSTANCES: APHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCEAND
THE LAW 44-48 (1993) (stating that requiring scientific standards may pose problems in
protecting public health).
2 See, e.g., id. (arguing that judges are wrong to exclude evidence that fails to meet
statistical significance because scientific burdens of proof are set at 95% whereas legal
burdens of proof are set at 50%). Professor Cranor is by no means alone in comparing
statistical significance with legal burdens of proof. Among others who have made this
argument are CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING
CHALLENGES 28 (1993); Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1157 (1994); Neff B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion
in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 385 (1985); Wayne Roth-Nelson &
Kathey Verdeal, Risk Evidence in Toxic Torts, 2 ENVTL. L. 405, 415-16 (1996)). Kaye, supra
note 150, at 65-66. Professor Kaye likens the use of conditional error rates in deciding
whether data satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard to "trying to find the
shortest path from Oxford to Cambridge by scrutinizing a map of London." Id. at 66.
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standard-the ninety-five percent confidence interval-is to avoid
claiming an effect when there is none (a false positive). 23 Scientists
who use a ninety-five percent confidence interval are making a
prediction that the results are due to something other than chance.
Judges, on the other hand, are simply charged with assuring that
testimony is more likely than not to be based on sound reasoning;
that it does not rely on incoherent probability assignments, internal
contradictions, or mathematical miscalculations, and that the
underlying studies describe reality as accurately as possible.324 To
say that "more likely than not" means that the probability of being
true is more than fifty percent, however, is wrong. The judge is not
making a prediction concerning the relative frequency of accurate
outcomes in repeated litigations.325 We have no way of knowing the
real probability of. a cause and effect relationship.326 Thus, the
standpoint of the argument is incorrect. It assumes we are looking
' Statistical significance tests aim to prevent the scientist from asserting a positive
effect when the effect may be due to chance. See David Ozenhoff & Leslie I. Bodin, Truth &
Consequences: Health Agency Responses to Environmental Health Problems, 12 SCI., TECH.
& HUM. VALUES 70, 73-74 (1987). Statistical significance is set by convention at a level of
significance, or p-value, of.05 (which corresponds to a confidence level of 95%). Fienberg et
al., supra note 41, at 22. "By rejecting a hypothesis only when the test is statistically
significant, we have placed an upper bound, 5%, on the chance of rejecting a true hypothesis."
Id. Another way of explaining statistical significance is that it describes the probability that
the procedure produced the observed effect by chance. Id. at 25. If the result is not
statistically significant, it may be either because the results were due to chance or because
the test lacked the power to discern a difference between the null hypothesis and the proposed
effect. Id. at 22. Power increases with the sample size of the study and with the degree of
difference from the null hypothesis, i.e., the more extreme the departure from the null
hypothesis, the higher the power. Id. Power will, therefore, be a problem for small studies
of low effects-precisely those most likely to be proffered in toxic tort cases. Thus, separate
studies of small numbers of subjects may not yield statistically significant results simply
because each test may lack the power to distinguish the null hypothesis of no effect from
patterns of illness that are not extreme. Id. (using employment discrimination as a
hypothetical example).
32 Walker, supra note 254, at 1093.
See id. at 1100 (arguing that factfinder is not indicating likelihood of truth of
proposition over long run). Rather, "the closest we might come to comparing significance
testing with burdens of proof would be to think about equalizing the risk of rejecting the null
hypothesis (no association) when it is true with the risk of accepting the alternative
hypothesis (an association of some magnitude) when it is not true." Michael D. Green,
Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 205,
222 (1997) [hereinafter Green, Regulating Toxic Substances]. This does not get us very far,
however, because we presently have no way of judging accuracy.
Green, Regulating Toxic Substances, supra note 325, at 221.
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back with the knowledge of what is an accurate outcome when all
we can know is whether the evidence points toward an increased
risk of association. 27
In addition, equating the legal and scientific standards errone-
ously assumes a common view of the strengths and weaknesses of
a particular study. Scientists and judges do not have such a
common viewpoint, however, because the legal process makes it
difficult to assess the strengths and weaknesses of a particular
study. 2' As a result, evidence that is uncontroversial to scientists,
like the applicability of animal studies to humans, for example,
appears highly contingent in court. Because of the probabilistic
nature of scientific facts, based as they are on underlying assump-
tions, litigation makes the data appear more controversial than they
actually are, creating an impression of conflict even when there is
little disagreement in practice. 29  Although this lack of depth
"s Professor Green contends that equating statistical significance with the legal burden
of proof is wrong because it confuses whether there is any effect at all with the magnitude of
any effect that may exist. Green, supra note 325, at 220-221. Professor Green argues that
the legal standard of proof is similar to relative risk rather than statistical significance. I
argue that this too is off the mark because neither the strength of association of any
particular study nor the likelihood that the study's results would have occurred had there
been no association is really compatible with the legal admissibility standard that the expert's
testimony is more likely than not to be scientifically valid. More goes into the validity
calculus than either statistical significance or relative risk. Statistical significance can
measure only the first consideration. Id. The second consideration-magnitude of effect- is
instead measured by relative risk. Id. Relative risk is an epidemiological term referring to
the proportion of disease in exposed versus unexposed populations. David E. Austin & S.
Benson Werner, Epidemiology for the Health Sciences 61 (1982). While significance testing
characterizes the probability that the relative risk would be the same as found in the study
if the results were due to chance, a relative risk of two is the threshold for a greater than fifty
percent chance that the effect was caused by the agent in question (the ratio of risk in exposed
versus unexposed populations, or strength of association). Green, supra note 325, at 222. As
Professor Green explains: "The p-value tells us the probability that the study outcome...
would occur if the null hypothesis (no association) is, in fact, true." Green, supra note 325,
at 222. Thus, the transliteration of the "more probable than not" standard of civil factfinding
into a quantitative threshold of statistical evidence is misconceived.
'9A See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47 (1993) (noting problem of"one-eyed factfinders" who
lack "depth perception" and tend to give all scientific evidence "equal value and relevance").
Professor Sanders observed that in the litigation over the anti-nausea drug Bendectin,
factfinders"learned little about the accumulation of scientific knowledge" because the lawyers
spent their time trying to undermine the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 47-51; see also
Berger, supra note 96, at 2128 (noting that"deconstructed evidence all tends to sound alike").
' See Sanders, supra note 328, at 48 (citing way in which illusion ofconflict was created
by attorneys in Bendectin litigation).
1102
1999] SCIENCE AND INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS 1103
perception may affect both parties equally before a jury, it has a
disparate impact on the proponent in admissibility determinations.
The proponent must, after all, convince the judge that the testimony
is scientifically valid.33 ' Creating an impression of conflict will make
the judge suspicious of evidence commonly relied on by those in the
scientific community, to the disadvantage of the party seeking
admissibility.
The legal and scientific standards are fundamentally different.
They have different goals and different measures. One cannot
justifiably argue, therefore, that evidence which fails to meet the
scientific standards nonetheless should be admissible because the
scientific standards are too high for preponderance determinations.
Although based on a faulty premise, Professor Cranor is right in
arguing that judges should not be using statistical significance--or
relative risk, for that matter-as a screening device.33' On the
contrary, as one scientist explained, "statistical significance testing
is a mechanical process that debases measurements into the
qualitative and sometimes misleading categories of 'significant' or
'not significant."'3 3 2 Making chance the primary explanation for any
set of observations without thinking about what the best explana-
tion might be is sloppy, leading to both under- and over-inclusive-
ness.33 Using statistical significance (or relative risk) as a screen
'o See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-93 (1993) (describing
steps in determining scientific validity).
"1 For cases using statistical significance or relative risk as a screening device to exclude
evidence, see, e.g., Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting studies that failed to demonstrate statistical significance); Kelley v. American
Heyer.Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 884 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (requiring statistical
significance); LeBlanc v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 782, 784 (E.D. La. 1996)
(requiring statistically significant epidemiologic studies); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v.
Havner, 953 S.W. 2d 706, 730 (Tex. 1997) (rejecting evidence that was not statistically
significant). But see Berry v. C.S.X. Transp., Inc., 704 So. 2d 633 (Fla. App. 1997) (rejecting
argument that only statistically significant associations should serve as the basis for
causation opinions); Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997) (holding trial court
over-emphasized need for statistical significance).
"' Kenneth J. Rothman, Significance Questing, 105 ANNALSOFINTERNALMEDICINE 445,
445 (1986).
' See id. Dr. Rothman explains that the unthinking use of statistical significance as
a screening device leads to both under- and over-inclusiveness, making real effects appear to
be due to chance and, conversely, making events that are really due to chance appear to have
a real cause and effect relationship. To demonstrate the concept of over-inclusiveness, he
notes that the probability of winning over a million dollars in a state lottery twice within a
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
ing device for admissibility is a mistake because rigid tests of
statistical significance may actually reveal less about the data than
other types of data analysis.3 4 For example, if there are multiple
studies showing a small but consistent effect, scientists tend to
believe that in itself is significant.335 In that way it is under-
inclusive. Conversely, statistical significance in the absence of
biological plausibility results in over-inclusiveness. 36
Moreover, some commentators find that the root of the causation
conundrum is the "amazingly uncritical" use of conventional
statistical methods which incorporate the notion of chance as an
explanation for the conflict of observation with prediction." 7
Instead, they argue, chance should be treated for what it really is,
a poor surrogate for admitting that we may not be able to account
for all the conditions that determine what we observe. 8' In other
words, they contend, labeling a result as due to random variation is
"just a way of making ignorance sound like technical explanation."3 9
So the unthinking use of statistical significance (or confidence
intervals, or relative risk) as a prerequisite for admissibility makes
little sense. 40 Is there another justifiable set of scientific criteria
that judges can use for causation determinations? One set of
short time is small enough to reject the null hypothesis but that dual jackpots are better
explained by chance. Id. at 446. His point is that an "algorithm for inference cannot
substitute for thinking about the problem." Id.
'. See Steven N. Goodman & Richard Royall, Evidence and Scientific Research, 78 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1568, 1568-74 (1988) (analyzing and criticizing use of p-values as evidence);
Charles Poole, Beyond the Confidence Interval, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 195, 195-99 (1987)
(noting criticisms of both significance testing and confidence intervals); W. Douglas
Thompson, Statistical Criteria in the Interpretation of Epidemiologic Data, 77 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 191, 191-94 (1987) (discussing lack of consensus regarding use of statistical tools in
determining role of chance).
' See Jennie A. Frieman et al., The Importance of Beta, The Type II Error and Sample
Size in the Design and Interpretation of the Randomized Control Trial" Survey of 71
"Negative" Trials, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 686, 690 (1978).
"' See Rothman, supra note 332, at 446 (noting that statistical significance testing can
"manufacture false controversies and obscure unifying quantitative interpretations").
"7 See Sander Greenland, Probability Versus Popper: An Elaboration ofthe Insufficiency
of Current Popperian Approaches for Epidemiologic Analysis, in CAUSAL INFERENCE 96, 102
(Kenneth J. Rothman ed. 1988); Henri Poincar6, Chance, in FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 395
(George Bruce Halsted transl., 1946).
33 Greenland, supra note 337, at 102.
Id.
'4 See Rothman, supra note 332, at 446-47 (excoriating use of significance testing, p-
values, or confidence intervals as a substitute for thinking about data).
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criteria frequently proposed are the criteria of Austin Hill.34' But
Hill himself explained that his criteria were not to be used in this
way.342 Koch's postulates for inferring causation of disease by
microorganisms are sometimes proposed as bases for scientific
validity.343 These simplistic frameworks are not useful criteria for
admissibility, however, because they, like the Federal Judicial
Center's Reference Manual guidelines, are unachievable. Few
studies could-or should-hope to meet all of the criteria. Differ-
ences arise among scientists in different disciplines, and even within
the same discipline regarding the amount of evidence needed to
justify causation." For example, consistency of the observed effect
is a criterion most scientists would consider important, but it may
be absent even where there is a strong causal link."" While it might
be persuasive to find that there was a consistent specific association
between exposure and a particular disease, such an association is
rarely observed. 4 Dose-response curves are important, but the
341 See Hill, supra note 135, at 295-300. These postulates require consideration of
strength of association, consistency with other scientists' results, specificity of association,
temporality, biological gradient or dose-response curve, biological plausibility, coherence, and
analogy with similar evidence.
3 Id.
m See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 40, at 28 (noting that"[m]ost scientists would agree
that evidence satisfying all Koch's postulates establishes a compelling case" for causation, but
explaining that they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for inferring causation).
Koch was a bacteriologist who outlined 10 criteria for causation, including: 1) higher
prevalence of disease in exposed than unexposed populations; 2) those with the disease should
have had more exposure to the agent than healthy populations; 3) experiments should
demonstrate increased incidence of disease in exposed over unexposed populations; 4)
temporality; 5) linear dose-response curve; 6) biological plausibility; and a number of other
factors relating to immune responses. See Alfred S. Evans, Causation and Disease: The
Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 YALE J. BIOLOGY&MED. 175, 192 (1976) (explaining that
these postulates "were not regarded as rigid criteria by Koch himself and should not be
today").
" For an example of the debate among scientists over which chemicals are human
carcinogens, compare Bruce N. Ames, What are the Major Carcinogens in the Etiology of
Human Cancer? Environmental Pollution, Natural Carcinogens, and Causes of Human
Cancer: Six Errors, in IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN ONCOLOGY 237 (Vincent T. Devita, Jr. et al.
eds., 1989) with Jean Marx, Animal Carcinogen Testing Challenged, 250 SCIENcE 743 (1990).
Greenland, supra note 337, at 16-17 (citing Hill).
Id. at 17. This factor is often referred to by the courts as a "signature" disease
although most courts recognize that it is not a prerequisite for admissibility. In re Joint E.
& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 798 F. Supp. 925, 931 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting
"signature disease" as only route by which plaintiff can prove causation), rev'd on other
grounds, 998 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1993); cf. National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965
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absence of a linear response does not necessarily destroy the causal
inference, although it does indicate a more complex relationship
between the agent and disease. 47 Temporality is the one criterion
that is universally recognized as a prerequisite for admissibility, but
everyone agrees that temporality alone is not enough.34 In sum,
scientists recognize that what matters most is the explanatory
power of the proffered theory and how well the data support the
theory.
C. RESOLVING THE CONUNDRUM
The contortions over causal attribution reflect uncertainty about
the interpretation of results, not their validity.349 Scientific
observations are explained by refutable theories. 5 ° The operative
question is not which data can establish causation but which
theories can explain the data. Causal inference is a matter of
explanation.35' The procedural jargon of scientific argument should
not blind lawyers to the fact that it is nonetheless argument. The
common preconception that the scientific method consists of
"systematic, controlled observation or experiment whose results lead
to hypotheses, which are found valid or invalid through further
work, leading to theories that are reliable because they were arrived
at with initial open-mindedness and continual critical skepticism"
turns the process of science on its head. 52 As Jerome Frank
remarked, the notion that "science is a charter of certainty" is an
unsophisticated and unscientific view of science which any intelli-
F. Supp. 1490, 1513-14 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (finding expert testimony failed to establish
"signature disease" theory).
"7 Greenland, supra note 342, at 18 (citing Hill). The Federal Judicial Center's
Reference Manual agrees on this point, noting that while the presence of a linear dose-
response relationship strengthens the inference of causation, its absence should not be taken
to weaken it. Bailey et al., supra note 284, at 163.
' Cranor et al., supra note 105, at 43. For example, the fact that most dead men are
bald does not necessarily mean that baldness is fatal.
'. See Stephan F. Lanes, The Logic of Causal Inference in Medicine, in CAUSAL
INFERENCE, supra note 337, at 59, 65 (discussing interpretation of empirical evidence).
No Id. at 66.
-6 Id. at 66.
52 HENRYH. BAUER, SCIENTIFIC LITERACYANDTHE MYTH OFTHE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 19
(1992).
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gent scientist would recognize as fiction "made simply to aid in
getting work done, made with complete recognition of its
unreality.
353
Science, no less than law, literature or philosophy, seeks to make
sense of the world. Both lawyers and scientists are concerned with
the presentation of evidence, and they argue about the meaning of
perceived facts.3 " While law also seeks to explain its outcomes as
a search for truth, 355 observation and experiment are not normally
considered part of the legal repertoire. This apparent divergence
over "genuine testability" is misleading, however. In both science
and law, what counts as factual proof is a mixture of inductive and
deductive reasoning hung upon a theoretical framework. 5 6 Normal
science operates "by extending the knowledge of those facts that the
paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the
extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm's
predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself."57 In
other words, scientific reasoning, like legal reasoning, involves the
use of analogy and precedent and depends for its coherence on the
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 307, 311 (1970).
" "The practice of the scientific method is the persistent critique of arguments, in the
light of tried canons for judging the reliability of the procedures by which evidential data are
obtained, and for assessing the probative force of the evidence on which conclusions are
based." ERNE T NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION 13 (1961). In legal argument, also, canons of construction are often used as
focal points for argument, though their indeterminacy is acknowledged. See, e.g., KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMONLAWTRADITION: DECIDINGAPPEALS 62-120,522-35 (1960) (setting
out leeways of precedent and thrust and parry. of statutory canons). The point of the "science
as process" movement in science, as with the legal realism movement in law, is that while the
canons themselves are indeterminate, there are evolved "steadying factors" which provide
continuity and predictability. For an explanation of this in the legal context, see id. at 4-5
(setting out 14 clusters of factors providing predictability in the courts and explaining that
"the most vital element in reckonability and stability is the courts' constant use, in
application of doctrine, and also in choosing among the branching doctrinal possibilities, of
the best sense and wisdom it can muster-but always in terms of those same traditions of the
work which we have seen as 'steadying factors' "). For readings in "science as process," see
generally SHEILA JASANOFF ET AL., HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 507
(1994).
3 See WILLIAMTWINING, THEORIES OFEVIDENCE: BENTHAMANDWIGMORE 12-18 (1985)
(discussing rationalist tradition in evidence scholarship and its main epistemological
assumption that the purpose of adjudication is to discover an objectively knowable truth).
3N See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 319, at 315 & n.9 C'[s]cientists and lawyers alike seek facts,
and they understand these facts in terms of some theory").
357 KUHN, supra note 28, at 24.
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ability to discern patterns and draw upon relationships of observed
phenomena. Careful construction of the hypothesis identifies,
defines, and clarifies the parameters of the experiment.5 8 Analyti-
cally, both science and law rely upon subjective judgments or
assumptions at every step on the way to reaching a conclusion.5 9
Science and legal analysis are also alike in that both function in
relation to the social and cultural conditions from which they
emerge, and both have reasonably consensual standards for testing
claims within a given paradigm.36 °
Rather than focusing on "positive" and "negative" studies,
interpretation should concentrate on the theory and the methodol-
ogy: what alternative explanations were and were not controlled. 6 '
For example, concerning the association between cigarette smoking
and lung cancer, the claim of a causal relation can only be justified
by examining the studies and refuting the noncausal explana-
tions. 62 In the absence of a competing causal theory, the theory
that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer is the best available
explanation of the data. 63  In sum, the studies concerning causal
theories should be interpreted by describing testable competing
hypotheses.364
Practically, this ought to mean that even studies which cannot
entirely support a causation hypothesis may be used in conjunction
with other studies to explain the hypothesis. The critical issue for
general causation is whether, based on all the evidence presented,
" See Donald W. Large & Preston Michie, Proving that the Strength of the British Navy
Depends on the Number of Old Maids In England: A Comparison of Scientific Proof with
Legal Proof, 11 ENvTL. L. 555, 564 (1981).
" See generally Lee Loevinger, Standards of Proof in Science and Law, 32JURIMETRICS
J. 323 (1992) (identifying similarities and differences between science and law in reaching
proof sufficient to support a conclusion).
'o One statement of this credo is that "science presupposes that there are objective
methods by which reliable knowledge can be tested[;] ... hypotheses ... can be warranted
(a) by reference to the evidence, (b) by criteria of rational coherence, and (c) by their predicted
experimental consequences." Paul Kurtz, The Growth ofAntiscience, 18 SKEPTICALINQUIRER
255, 258 (1994).
" See Lanes, supra note 349, at 66 (discussing shifting focus of interpretation from
results to methods).
36 See id. (examining competing theories of causal connection).
See id. at 70-71 (differentiating between plausible and best explanations).See id. at 72 (considering this as superior approach).
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an agent is more likely than not to cause disease in humans.365
Certainly that is the way scientists themselves assess the studies.366
Yet courts, including the Supreme Court,36 7 are excluding evidence
simply because a single study cannot support causation. This
makes little sense from a scientific or a legal viewpoint.
VI. CONCLUSION
To put the matter into perspective, many judges are demanding
that scientists adopt legal definitions of scientific terms. No
scientist can say with certainty that an association is causal.368
Even the statement that an association is probably causal is
unverifiable for the simple reason that there is no way to calculate
whether a given scientific theory is true or false.369 Accordingly,
there is no way definitively to calculate that an exposure causes a
disease.370 The most that can be expected from scientific evidence
is a probabilistic statement about the association of exposure and
disease.
This probabilistic statement relies on an analysis of all the
available evidence in light of a biologically coherent theory of
causation. Multiple sources of evidence ensure the "greatest
' See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 780 (3d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging
standard employed in civil litigation is that employed by EPA for classifying carcinogens).
' For example, an epidemiologist reviewing 71 epidemiological studies, none of which
showed statistically significant effects, nonetheless concluded that the studies "should not be
viewed as conclusive given the typically small sample size that could consistently overlook
important results." Frieman et al., supra note 335, at 690.
s' See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1997) (upholding the district
court's ruling that because each of the proffered studies was incapable of supporting the
entire causation hypothesis, none was admissible). The plaintiffand the dissent, on the other
hand, argued that the studies should be assessed in conjunction with each other. Id. at 152-
53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3 See Stephen F. Lanes, Error and Uncertainty in Causal Inference, in CAUSAL
INFERENCE, supra note 337, at 173, 182 (discussing difficulty in labeling relationship or
association as causal).
Id. at 182-83.
o See id. Thus, there can be no empirical support for the statement that causation is
the most likely explanation for an association. "The uncertainty in causal inference is
attributable to the fact that we cannot establish that an association is valid." Id. at 185. An
unidentifiable error may exist and it may cause the observation. Id. The most that can be
expected of strength of association, the shape of a dose-response curve and the level of
statistical significance is that they affect subjective beliefs. Id. at 185-86.
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scientific certainty."371 The EPA Proposed Guidelines use just such
a probabilistic approach. They offer salutary and much-needed
guidance for the federal judiciary. With respect to the admissibility
of scientific evidence, it should be sufficient that the cumulative
impact of all the proffered information makes it likely that this
particular chemical (or agent) is associated with human disease. 72
This standard translates into the familiar "more probable than not"
standard-the same standard the EPA uses in making its determi-
nations with respect to the likelihood of an agent's causing a
disease. 13
Assessing all of the available evidence in conjunction with the
biological plausibility of the causation theory is necessary for
scientific validity. No checklist or bright-line rule can make the
assessment of scientific causation evidence easy for judges. There
simply is no way around having to think critically about the
evidence and to weigh the studies proffered in conjunction with each
other.374 Thus, while the legal frameworks available to judges for
guidance each offer insights, none is sufficient by itself. Daubert
and Joiner emphasize the importance of judicial accountability in
evidentiary decisionmaking. The Federal Judicial Center's Refer-
ence Manual clarifies a number of scientific concepts. The scientific
validity analysis set out in the EPA's Proposed Guidelines offers a
sound methodological approach to assessing imperfect information.
3T1 Cranor et al., supra note 105, at 29 (emphasis omitted).
See Brennan, supra note 102, at 469-92 (evaluating role of various approaches to
problem); see also Walker, supra note 254 (explaining that frequency interpretation of more
probable than not makes little sense when the issue is the "chain of causal events leading to
a specific plaintiffs liver cancer").
' Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11, at 17,961.
14 As a result, some commentators propose abandoning the whole concept of causation
in toxic tort cases, arguing that the realities of scientific uncertainty make attribution of
cause and effect too difficult a task for the legal system. See Berger, supra note 96, at 2143.
Professor Berger proposes imposing liability instead for "failure to provide substantial
information relating to risk, under a theory of absolute liability for failure to meet a standard
ofcare in developing and disseminating information. Id. Rather than abandoning causation,
however, judges can learn to think critically about the evidence before them. Admirably,
some already do so. Judge Becker, for example, has guided the Third Circuit in admissibility
determinations, consistently crafting thoughtful, warranted and fair admissibility decisions.
See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (showing well-reasoned
decision).
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Although none of these guidelines is useful alone, by combining
the underlying tenets of each with a theoretical foundation based on
philosophy of science teachings, the courts could make a significant
step in the right direction. A heuristic built from these insights
would make sound scientific and legal sense. In examining the
guidelines already available to judges and suggesting a way in
which the crucial insights from each could be combined, this Article
offers a first step toward such a heuristic.
